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Abstract
The rapid increase in mobile malware and deployment of over-privileged applications
over the years has been of great concern to the security community. Encroaching on
user’s privacy, mobile applications (apps) increasingly exploit various sensitive data
on mobile devices. The information gathered by these applications is sufficient to
uniquely and accurately profile users and can cause tremendous personal and financial
damage.
On Android specifically, the security and privacy holes in the operating system
and framework code has created a whole new dynamic for malware and privacy
exploitation. This research work seeks to develop novel analysis techniques that
monitor Android applications for possible unwanted behaviors and then suggest
various ways to deal with the privacy leaks associated with them.
Current state-of-the-art static malware analysis techniques on Android focused
mainly on detecting known variants without factoring any kind of software
obfuscation. The dynamic analysis systems on the other hand are heavily dependent
on extending the Android OS and/or runtime virtual machine. These methodologies
often tied the system to a single Android version and/or kernel making it very difficult
to port to a new device. In privacy, access to the database system’s objects are not
controlled by any security check beyond overly-broad read/write permissions. This
flawed model exposes the database contents to abuse by privacy-agnostic apps and
malware. This research addresses the problems above in three ways.
viii
First, we developed a novel static analysis technique that fingerprints known
malware based on three-level similarity matching. It scores similarity as a function of
normalized opcode sequences found in sensitive functional modules and application
permission requests. Our system has an improved detection ratio over current research
tools and top COTS anti-virus products while maintaining a high level of resiliency
to both simple and complex obfuscation.
Next, we augment the signature-related weaknesses of our static classifier with
a hybrid analysis system which incorporates bytecode instrumentation and dynamic
runtime monitoring to examine unknown malware samples. Using the concept of
Aspect-oriented programming, this technique involves recompiling security checking
code into an unknown binary for data flow analysis, resource abuse tracing, and
analytics of other suspicious behaviors. Our system logs all the intercepted activities
dynamically at runtime without the need for building custom kernels.
Finally, we designed a user-level privacy policy enforcement system that gives
users more control over their personal data saved in the SQLite database. Using
bytecode weaving for query re-writing and enforcing access control, our system forces
new policies at the schema, column, and entity levels of databases without rooting or
voiding device warranty.
Android, Malware Analysis, Fingerprinting, Hybrid Analysis, Instrumentation, AspectJ,
Similarity Matching, Privacy, Security, Obfuscation
ix
Chapter 1
Introduction
Smartphones are powerful, high-tech devices designed with an operating system of a
traditional computer. It’s low-level system design together with other sophisticated
hardware and sensor components has completely changed the face of handheld
devices. This technology has not only revolutionized our telephony experience but has
successfully integrated a vast amount of personal data, including our address books,
calendars, diaries, pictures, etc., onto a single device. From a security perspective, the
ease and convenience provided by this integration can have disastrous consequences,
serving as a single point of exposure for a tremendous amount of personal data if not
properly managed.
Android is a smartphone operating system developed by Google in alliance with
15 other tech companies. The objective was to design an open standard operating
system for mobile devices [6]. This operating system, which was unveiled in 2007,
has consistently enjoyed wide acceptance by many high-tech device manufacturers.
According to a report by Statista 2016 [4], Android has maintained dominance in the
global smartphone market for over five years in a row.
The Android system is built on top of a Linux kernel, which provides all the low-
level management and access to the hardware components. Its security framework
is designed to protect data and resources using two important concepts: Application
sandboxing and a permissions model. With the permissions model, access is granted
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by exclusive consent of the device user at installation time. However, its inflexibility
in choices and irrevocability have left device user’s vulnerable to privacy and security
exposure by both malware and over-privileged or privacy-agnostic applications.
Although the newest versions of Android are not designed with the all-or-nothing
permission model, as of May 2016 [1], they constitute only about 13.1% of all global
Android market share, leaving the remaining 86% vulnerable to extreme data abuse.
This thesis focuses on security monitoring of Android application for possible il-
licit behaviors via malware analysis. It also develops privacy policy enforcement
techniques aimed at limiting access to very important device data.
1.1 Android Malware Analysis
The growing threat to user’s security and privacy by Android applications has
significantly increased the need for more reliable and accessible app analysis systems.
Android apps are well-known for security and privacy violations and data leakage [42].
For instance, they transfer personal data outside the devices of end-users without
their consent. Andrubis [78] performed an analysis on over a million (malicious, and
benign) apps, and found that 38.79% of the apps have data leakage. The percentage
further increases from 13.45% in 2010 to 49.78% in 2014, and is also noted by Yajin
et al. [91].
In 2014, the Android platform is estimated to account for 97% of all malware on
mobile devices [3]. According to GDATA report [71], over 2 million Android malware
samples were detected in 2015, representing over a 50% increase from 2014. Modern
malware is in use on an industrial scale by crime organizations and its development
is often highly professional. In many respects, this presents an even greater threat to
users than before, as mobiles are entrusted with the most private of information and
mobile malware can very effectively spy on users in real time.
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Traditionally, Android apps are analyzed using either static or dynamic ap-
proaches. Static analysis involves the use of predetermined signatures and/or other
semantic artifacts such as API calls, strings etc. Enck et al. developed Kirin [33]
which evaluates privacy risk based on the set of permissions requested, while [36, 93]
analyzed Android applications by evaluating fine-grained API calls in addition to the
permissions set. Other semantic-based analysis tools [38, 79] examine components
and intents in addition to the permissions and API calls made within the application
binary.
Dynamic analysis, on the other hand, executes a target application in a
contained environment [84, 83, 15, 18, 19, 35, 51, 32, 31, 62] and monitors its
behavior. In general, static analysis has the advantage of high performance and
coverage. Conversely, simple obfuscation can hinder the extraction of important data
such as API names. Dynamic analysis on the other hand provides a better view of an
app’s behavior, although, it is usually limited in scope to observed execution paths.
1.2 Data Privacy
While malware is a significant security threat on Android devices, privacy-related
issues posed by over-privileged applications is equally threatening to mobile device
users.
Android requires third-party applications to make explicit requests for resources
and access to data at installation time and while this mechanism provides a general
idea of what an application can access on a device, it does not provide the ability
to institute fine-grained control over sensitive data. Essentially, it’s an all-or-nothing
model on most versions of Android under which the user has to approve all permissions
or abort the installation of the application. Perhaps more disturbing is that the
approved permissions remain a right of the installed application as long as it remains
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on the phone.
Android extends the permission model to cover structured data stored in SQLite
databases. However, it does not separate roles and privileges on the database, nor
does it protect content data at the schema or entity levels. In fact, it does very little
to protect the privacy of the stored user data and its associated metadata. Such
a wide level of access is tantamount to giving the application administrative rights
over the target provider. For example, this system does not distinguish accesses to
a contact’s phone number from the email and physical addresses. Other important
information like the “last time contacted” as well as account type and names are
also easily accessible with a simple READ permission. Similarly, write permission on
the contacts provider allows an application to insert, delete and modify any contact
at will. The application can also create groups and make them invisible. Such
“perceived” benign access, however, can lead to malicious contacts being created
and synched to restricted groups in major accounts like Google.
1.3 Contributions and Outline
This research work develops a fast and efficient static fingerprinting algorithm that
can detect obfuscated malware variants with a high degree of accuracy. It scores
similarity as a function of structural and behavioral features which are matched based
on 3-level similarity matching algorithm.
Although fast, accurate, and resilient, this static analyzer is heavily dependent
on known signatures and as such cannot detect unknown samples. To augment this
drawback, we designed an app-level hybrid analysis system that monitors Android
apps for possible illicit activities using bytecode instrumentation. This system
performs taint-tracking, resource abuse tracing and analytics of suspicious activities
independent of the Android runtime and/or kernel.
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Finally, this thesis also addresses privacy issues on Android SQLite databases
by enforcing access control at schema, column and entity levels, thus giving users
absolute control over their data.
The outline of this work is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 introduces software obfuscation techniques with emphasis on trans-
formations that can hinder static analysis on Android. This chapter is largely
based on existing work.
• Chapter 3 describes the first contribution of this thesis. OpSeq is a static
malware fingerprinting algorithm based on statistical similarity that includes -
feature extraction, signature generation, and matching processes. The chapter
provides detailed description of its prototype implementation and the evaluation
of the experimental results. The material from this chapter is drawn from a
workshop paper [11] which appeared in the Privacy Protection and Reverse
Engineering Workshop 2015. Since the original publication of this result, other
researchers have proposed several alternatives to this approach [52, 65].
• Chapter 4 provides a brief background of software instrumentation and static
bytecode weaving. It introduces the concept of Aspect-oriented programming
and how it can be used to inject cross-cutting concerns in Android applications.
• Chapter 5 introduces AspectDroid , a hybrid analysis system for Android apps.
This chapter highlights its workflow architecture and detailed implementation
and evaluation of its prototype. The system and experimental results from this
chapter are based on a published conference poster [12] and an extended version,
currently under review by the Journal of Computer Virology and Hacking.
• Chapter 6 introduces SQLite databases as the RDBMS for Android systems.
It also discusses the Android native content provider library as a security and
5
abstraction layer built on top of the SQLite engine.
• Chapter 7 discusses the last component of this thesis, called priVy , a privacy
policy enforcement technique for Android applications that provides low-level
access control for Android SQLite databases. In this chapter we explained how
bytecode weaving can be used for privacy policy enforcement on Android SQLite
database objects through access verification, query rewriting, and auditing. The
prototype discussed here is adapted from a conference paper [13] published in
WiSec 2016.
• Finally, Chapter 8 concludes with a summary of the contributions and possible
future work.
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Chapter 2
Software Obfuscation
Obfuscation involves the transformation of software code into an ambiguous form to
hinder reverse engineering efforts without losing its functionality. Often obfuscation
techniques are deployed to protect the intellectual propriety of software or by malware
to circumvent static detection or fingerprinting algorithms.
Variants of the same malware can be created using simple or complex obfus-
cation techniques to evade detection. Such techniques make it difficult for analysts
to manually understand the behaviors of a malware by thwarting disassembly and
decompilation processes [68], e.g., through code packing, control flow redirection, etc.
Different obfuscation tools are available either as research prototypes, commer-
cial products, or open source tools. How and where these schemes can be used depends
on a number of factors:
• Software Programming Language: Languages with different intermediate rep-
resentation often require different kinds of tools to obfuscate. Such tools
have to understand the binary structure of the executable and disassembly
representation. For example, tools designed for C/C++ compiled binaries may
not work for Java executables. The former disassembles into assembly code
with different kinds of instruction compositions (opcode and operand), while
the latter disassembles into Java bytecode.
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• Stealthiness: Depending on the need for obfuscation, malware may employ a
trivial or non-trivial technique to make reverse engineering difficult. Simple
techniques like identifier encryption and null pointer insertion can be used
to deter understanding of the program’s semantics. However, they may not
necessarily make reverse engineering infeasible. Other high-end stealthy tech-
niques use Packers to encrypt the malicious code or employ anti-disassembly
techniques within the executable such as fake jump instructions to confuse
the dissembler. Often the more complex the obfuscation is the more stealthy
the malware will be.
• Cost: Although malware may want to block any access to its underlying code, it
is vital that the program executes on a target system effectively with acceptable
overhead.
• Detection Algorithm: There is always a correlation between the code analysis
technique and obfuscation mechanism, especially in simple obfuscation. For
example, string encryption can hinder semantic based detection algorithms
but not opcode sequence-based tools. On the other hand, code insertion,
substitution, and reordering will not have any devastating effect on semantic-
based systems. However, complex obfuscation that involves more than one
simple technique or employs stealthy code hardening like whole class encryption
may completely hinder any form of static analysis.
2.1 Android Malware Transformation
Android malware are often created by injecting malicious payloads into benign
applications. They employ various forms of obfuscation techniques to hide their
presence from antivirus scanners. Recent studies have shown that common antivirus
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software and static analysis tools are not resilient to such obfuscation techniques.
Most Android applications are written in Java, which are then compiled into
bytecode in a class file. The compiled class files are further compressed using the
dx utility into a classes.dex file. Although the execution of native code written in
C/C++ is made possible using the Java native interface, very few Android apps use
native code. Important application components such as package name, SDK version,
component names etc., are found in the AndroidManifest.xml.
Various forms of software obfuscation on Android are employed on application
files within the dex file, the Android manifest, resource files or in the native code.
Based on the existing literature on Android obfuscation [63, 87, 58, 27], some of these
schemes can be grouped as:
• Identifier Transformation: This involves a simple change in string identifiers
and names from within the dex file or the xml files packaged in the Android
application.
• Encryption: Algorithms such as simple cryptographic hashes or complex cus-
tomizable algorithms can be employed by malware to deter analysis. Such
encryption can include whole class encryption, identifier encryption (method
names), and string encryption (URL names).
• Code Reordering: In this technique, chunks of code within the program body are
repositioned through control flow changes. In practice, this will not change the
functionality of the malware even though it may change the execution pattern.
• Junk Code Insertion: Null pointers and dead code through unreachable control
flow can be added to the Android dex file to bloat the executable and completely
break hash-based detection algorithms. This may also be employed to make
program comprehension very difficult through manual examination.
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• Java Reflection: This is a programming practice in Java that allows function
calls to be resolved dynamically at runtime. Using this method, malware
can make API calls inaccessible within the disassembled bytecode and as such
techniques relying on API semantics will be thwarted.
Below is an example of how malware can use string encryption plus Java
reflection to hide its request for Android IMEI.
Listing 2.1: Software Obfuscation
//Getting device ID without obfuscation
TelephonyManager mTelephony = (TelephonyManager)
getSystemService(Context.TELEPHONY_SERVICE);
String imei = mTelephony.getDeviceId();
//Getting Android device ID (IMEI) using encryption and java reflection
//It first use the DecryptName function whose implementation decrypts the
string encryptName to getDeviceId
String methName = DecryptName("encryptName");
Class nullParams []= {};
TelephonyManager mTelephony = (TelephonyManager)
getSystemService(Context.TELEPHONY_SERVICE);
//Get Telephony class object
Class clazz = mTelephony.getClass();
//Initialize a new instance of Telephony object
Object myObj = clazz.newInstance();
//Get method name from Telephony class whose name = getDeviceId
Method meth = clazz.getDeclaredMethod (methName,nullParams);
//invoke getDeviceId on the new Telephony object
Object ret = meth.invoke(myObj, null);
}
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Chapter 3
Static Malware Fingerprinting
3.1 OpSeq
Signature-based malware detection systems have long been used in identifying known
malicious samples. On Android systems, malware is often introduced by repackaging
benign applications with obfuscated malicious payloads, via a variety of transfor-
mations. These forms of obfuscation have been shown to trick commercial antivirus
products [63, 87] and by extension the methodologies of many other Android research
tools. Most of these common tools use algorithms that search application code for
strings or other signatures, which can easily be subverted. Our aim is to develop
a better system that can detect known malware, which have been obfuscated and
repackaged within a new application.
In this task we present OpSeq–a new malware-variant detection approach that
is resilient against common obfuscation techniques, including reflection, encryption,
code reordering and junk insertion. It scores similarity as a function of normalized
opcode sequences found in sensitive functional modules as well as app permission re-
quests. This combination of structural and behavioral features results in a distinctive
fingerprint for a malware sample, thereby improving our model’s overall recall rate.
Given a malicious application, OpSeq performs static analysis of the application
code and identifies functional level components (Java methods) referred to as sensitive
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functional modules. These modules invoke vital APIs such as reflective, permission-
guarded, resource/data access and network/file system activities. Based on the
characterization of Android malware in well-known existing work [92], these sensitive
APIs open a channel by which malicious apps can manipulate a victim’s device.
OpSeq extracts the components from a known sample and creates corresponding
signatures, which are used to search for similar components in target applications.
Target applications are then classified as malicious or benign based on this evaluation.
This approach is a significant improvement over existing work that targets opcode-
sequence similarity [44, 90, 66], in that it filters out irrelevant application code
(reducing noise in signatures) and focuses only on a small portion of code that has
high potential to contain malicious code (making signatures more accurate). As
a secondary feature, we use the list of requested permissions to improve detection
accuracy, as app variants tend to have very similar permission sets.
3.2 Related Work
The first large-scale study of Android malware–the Android Malware Genome
Project–was carried out by Zhou and Jiang [92]. Their work was aimed at characteriz-
ing existing Android malware but they did not detail their analysis and classification
methodology. However, the corpus and characterization information they provided
became the basis for a lot of follow up research, including ours. Their work identified
that 86% of the malware is found as repackaged apps.
3.2.1 Opcode-sequence similarity
Santos et al. [66] developed a system of detecting malware using opcode-sequence fre-
quencies on the Intel x86 platform. On Android, Hanna and Zhou [44, 90] developed
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methodologies for using opcode-sequences to detect repackaged applications in both
primary and secondary app markets. Our work differs from theirs in terms of goals and
approach: theirs is focused on detecting application repackaging in general, whereas
we are interested in detecting malware, in particular. Their opcode-sequence-based
detection can be disturbed with relative ease by injecting small amounts of noise;
in contrast, we explicitly designed our approach to deal with different obfuscation
techniques. Our system normalizes an opcode-sequence both on the known and target
samples before comparison, which significantly reduces the effects of dead and junk
code on our similarity measures.
For example, using the same target code snipped illustrated by [49] in their
evaluation of Android repackaging detection algorithms, the original sequence is
altered with series of junk instructions to form an obfuscated version as shown
with the mnemonics in Listing 3.1. In the worst case, DroidMoss [90] can take the
hash of the entire sequence (i.e., a 4-gram). In such cases, detection can be evaded
completely. Conversely, in its best case, using a 2-gram rest point, DroidMoss can
attain a maximum of ≈15% similarity.
However, our algorithm first normalizes both sequences into 2-gram sub-
sequences, as shown in Listing 3.2. The target-overlap coefficient, which gives
emphasis to the known profile, will be ≈ 67%. Furthermore, our small structured
signatures target only sensitive functions, which can help eliminate most GUI code.
This is useful because GUI code is almost always irrelevant for malware detection.
Listing 3.1: Original and obfuscated sequences
//Original sequence
invoke-static, move-result-object, const-string, invoke-interface
//Obfuscated sequence
invoke-static, move-result-object, move-object, const-string, move,
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invoke-interface, move, move-object
Listing 3.2: Original and obfuscated sequences
//Original sequence
const-string invoke-interface, invoke-interface invoke-static,
invoke-static move-result-object
//Obfuscated sequence
const-string invoke-interface, invoke-interface invoke-static,
invoke-static move, move move, move move-object, move-object
move-object, move-object move-result-object
3.2.2 Semantic-based detection
Semantic-based detection uses information flows as features to detect similarity
between Android applications [28, 30, 39, 67, 80, 88, 89]. PiggyApps [89] first identifies
the code containing the main functionality (the primary module) in legitimate apps.
Then, it extracts and organizes this semantic information from the module as a
vantage point tree. The resulting signatures are used to search for “piggybacked”
apps in Android markets. Apposcopy [39] provides a specification language that
allows the manual creation of signatures for known malware. To find similarities,
it extracts semantic features of a new app using inter-component call graphs and
performs static taint analysis.
DroidLegacy [30] is an API-based static malware detection system that breaks
an app into sub-modules. The set of API calls made in these modules are compared
against the signatures of known samples. DroidAnalytics [88] uses a three-level
signature that represents API calls made from within apps. API call sequences form
signatures for methods, and the collection of all method signatures forms a signature
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for each class. The collection of class signatures then forms the signature for the
entire application. All of the techniques discussed above can be easily circumvented
with simple obfuscation. Encryption alone can hinder data flow analyses while
the combination of encryption and reflection will make it difficult to extract any
meaningful information from the application code.
3.2.3 Permission-based certification
Kirin [34] detects dangerous behavior in applications by analyzing their permission
requests. It uses a set of rules that defines which permissions combinations might
be dangerous. Another permission-based behavioral fingerprinting is DroidRanger
[94]. However, as detailed in [37], most Android apps are over-privileged in general
and even benign apps have a tendency to request combinations of permissions that
could be considered dangerous. SCanDroid [41] is a security certification tool that
determines if specifications in the application manifest match what is requested within
the app’s components. RiskRanker [43] provides a systematic approach that measures
the risk of dangerous behavior associated with an application based on native code,
dynamic class loading, and callback handlers. VetDroid [86] uses dynamic analyses
to reconstruct how permissions are used to access resources. All these techniques
attempt to discover if dangerous behavior is present, while OpSeq ’s primary goal is
to measure similarity of unknown apps against known malware.
3.3 System Design
The OpSeq architecture consists of two major components as shown in Figure 3.1:
feature extraction, and signature generation. Feature extraction identifies code in
sensitive functional modules and extracts the corresponding opcode-sequences. It also
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Figure 3.1: OpSeq Signature Generation Workflow
extracts the list of permissions used by the app to gain access to system resources.
The signature generation step normalizes the sequences from feature extraction, and
then slices each into a small chunk of n-gram opcodes, which constitute the signature
used for similarity matching.
OpSeq ’s signature matching is a 3-step process, each illustrated in the algorithms
1, 2, and 3, respectively. We use a bottom-up approach consisting of three levels
for similarity detection. First, we determine matches at the opcode level, and then
their aggregate gives the similarity at the functional level. Finally, the result of
functional-level and permission-overlap determines the final index. A similarity score
is computed at each level where a subsequent level takes into account the score of
its immediate last level, achieving substantial improvement in the overall accuracy of
our system.
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3.3.1 Feature extraction
In the feature extraction phase, permission requests and functional opcodes are
extracted from the app’s manifest and classes.dex files, respectively. The
classes.dex file, denoted by cd, is a set of m Java classes, jc:
cd = {jc1, jc2, . . . , jcm}. (3.3.1)
Each Java class jck, 1 ≤ k ≤ m is made up of n functions.
jck = {fk1 fk2 , . . . , fkn}. (3.3.2)
We can simplify the notation by aggregating the set of functions in a dex file as:
cd =
m∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
f ji . (3.3.3)
An individual function fi consists of set of instructions I: fi = {I1, I2, . . . , Ik}.
Instructions are tuples containing an opcode o and a (potentially empty) list of
operands. For the purposes of our analysis, we focus solely on the opcodes and
we disregard the operands. In other words, we view a function f as a sequence of i
opcodes:
f = o1, o2, . . . , ok. (3.3.4)
To be included in the feature set, we filter the list of functions based on two criteria:
a) the function must invoke at least one method from a sensitive API (a manually
compiled list of selected system APIs); and b) its opcode sequence is not on the list
of the most commonly found opcode sequences FS (determined empirically).
17
3.3.2 Signature generation
Our signatures are formed by taking into account the type of obfuscation that can
affect opcode sequences; these include both junk code insertion and code reordering.
Junk code insertion is an obfuscation technique which embeds pools of instructions
that never execute at run time, such as instructions in an artificial if-else branch
that never triggers. Code reordering permutes instructions that have no ordering
dependencies; the main point is to subvert hash-based detection schemes.
The next step of the process is to normalize the extracted opcodes in each
sequence f. This distorts the order of opcode arrangement and groups similar opcodes
in the same cluster. Next, for each normalized opcode sequence, we generate sub-
sequences of n-gram opcodes. In choosing the best value for n, we run our system
with uni-gram, 2-gram and 3-gram. Empirical results (as shown in section 3.4.3)
indicate that 2-gram gives the best accuracy. From now on, we refer to each sequence
(representing one function) containing k number of 2-gram opcodes as a pattern P.
S = {P 1, P 2, . . . , Pm} (3.3.5)
where each
Pm = {osm1 , osm2 , . . . , osmi } (3.3.6)
Depending on the number of sensitive functions found, a signature for a known profile
S is a set of m patterns P, where each pattern is a set of i 2-gram opcodes, denoted
as os. This forms the structural features for the familial malware.
Our technique allows similarity to be measured from the basic unit of code
upwards. Similarity between apps becomes an aggregate of individual functional
similarities and as such the likelihood of determining relationships between two related
codes increases.
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We know that malware variants will not be exact copies of one another, but our
assumption is that most of their malicious functionality and code structure remains
similar. Malware can add, remove, or substitute code within a function. However,
for it to retain vital key behaviors, some part of the code has to be consistent across
variants. Thus by carefully analyzing each function as a single unit and normalizing
its opcodes, our algorithm can ascertain whether a relationship exists between two
functions of different applications.
3.3.3 Similarity Matching
Our similarity matching is a 3-step process that begins with Pattern-level similarity,
then Function-level similarity to determine a score for all the matched functions.
Lastly, the Final-similarity index scores similarity as a function of the Function-level
similarity and permissions overlap.
Pattern-level similarity Given a reference piece of malware A with signature SA
and sample application B with signature SB:
SA ={P 1,P 2,. . . ,Pm}
Pm={osm1 ,osm2 ,. . . ,osmi }
SB ={P 1,P 2,. . . ,P n}
P n ={osn1 ,osn2 ,. . . ,osnj }
(3.3.7)
For each Pm in SA , we determine its best match in SB using the Targeted Overlap
Coefficient (TOC ) technique[75]. TOC is derived from the Overlap Coefficient
or Szymkiewicz-Simpson coefficient, which is defined as the ratio of the size of the
intersection of two sets to the size of a target set.
In pattern-level similarity, the TOC measures the ratio of common 2-gram
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opcodes found in the intersection of P n and Pm to the size of Pm, given Pm as
the target set. The result indicates the power of inclusion of Pm in P n. The TOC,
denoted by R(P n, Pm) is:
R(Pm, P n) = |P n ∩ Pm|/|Pm| (3.3.8)
Since our algorithm specifically leverages finding the relationship between a new
pattern and a known target pattern, the TOC is our preferred similarity metric. To
determine how Pm relates to P n, we require a threshold value T define as pattern-level
threshold (PLT). This denotes the minimum acceptable similarity ratio. In this step,
If R (Pm, P n) ≥ T then we write R to a buffer BUF and we eliminate both Pm and
P n. While if R (Pm, P n) < T then Pm is eliminated while P n remains. This loop
continues until all the patterns in SA are compared to patterns in SB (Algorithm 1).
The pattern-level similarity is measured by the value of R, which lies between
0 and 1. As R approaches 1, it means most 2-gram opcodes found in Pm are also
present in P n, hence Pm is similar to P n. However as R approaches 0, the similarity
between Pm and P n diminishes. The similarity score calculated is not transitive–Pm
is a pattern from our known profiles while P n is a pattern in a test sample and the
idea is to calculate how close Pm is to P n and not vice versa. A positive outcome at
this level of matching can be attributed to one of the following reasons. If Pm and P n
are modules with the same functionality then R will be close to 1. It is also possible
P n is a disguised version of Pm that has been obfuscated but still retains most of its
original opcodes. In this situation, we can also derive a match. It is also possible for
Pm and P n to match to a certain degree even though neither is derived from same
functional module, which will create a false positive. Our evaluation results have
shown this is quite rare in practice.
This pattern level-matching algorithm has proven effective in overcoming the
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effect of junk insertion and reordering obfuscation techniques.
Function-level similarity This step analyzes all the results generated in pattern-
level matching. As shown above, for each matched pattern, the derived coefficient is
stored in a buffer BUF.
BUF = {R1, R2, . . . , Rk} (3.3.9)
The set of ratios represents all the matched functions between SA and SB.
Function-level matching calculates a score between two samples as an aggregate of
their pattern-level matching. As preliminary testing, we tried 4 different similarity
coefficients (Cosine, Jaccard, Edit Distance and Sorensen (Dice) Coefficient) on
sample sets and measured the results. The Dice Coefficient gave us the best result.
Briefly, the Dice coefficient is a measure of the intersection between two given sets
scaled by their size. Although the choice of Dice Coefficient here is basically empirical,
in general, it gives more weight when there is an intersection than the Jaccard thus
strengthening similarity. The Dice Coefficient D is defined as follows:
D(SA, SB) = 2* |SA ∩ Sb|/|SA + SB| (3.3.10)
A value of T (pattern-level threshold) that is close to 1 means each R in BUF
is also close to 1. Thus:
|SA ∩ SB| =
∑
BUF (3.3.11)
And therefore:
D = 2*(
∑
BUF ) / |SA + SB| (3.3.12)
The coefficient D (Algorithm 2) denotes structural similarity between extracted
functions found in two applications.
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Final-similarity index The final similarity score is calculated based on the result
of function-level matching and permissions overlap. We first need to calculate the
permissions overlap using the Targeted Overlap Coefficient:
permA = permission list in A
permB = permission list in B
(3.3.13)
Thus the permission overlap from A to B, called PO, is given as:
PO (A,B) = |permA ∩ PermB|/|permA| (3.3.14)
This gives the ratio of similar permissions found in A and B against the length of set
of permissions for A . The permissions overlap is a weight that strengthens the result
of the function-level matching and indicates (at a coarse-grained level) what behavior
is common between A and B . If two apps contain the same malware footprint, they
normally should have some common permissions. The overlap coefficient is a value
between 0 and 1.
The final similarity index given as SS and is a function of function-level
similarity D and permissions overlap PO. This is defined as:
SS = D * PO (3.3.15)
The value of SS is a coefficient that indicates the strength of similarity between
two applications based on our extracted features. A minimum similarity index MSI
is required to determine if the coefficient SS is good enough. Thus when SS ≥ MSI,
we report that a known footprint for malicious code is present in the target app.
The summary of all the design notation is shown in Table 3.1.
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Algorithm 1 Pattern-Level Matching
function :(PLM(SA, SB, T))
for Pm in SA do:
for P n in SB do
inter=multi intersect(Pm, P n)
coef = len(inter) / len(Pm)
if coef ≥ T then:
append(coef, BUF)
remove(P n, SB)
end if
end for
end for
return BUF
end function
Algorithm 2 Function-Level Matching - Dice coefficient
function :(FLM(SA, SB, BUF))
suM=sum(BUF)
funAvg= 2/ (len(SA)+len(SB)
D = funcAvg * suM
return D
end function
Algorithm 3 Final-Similarity Index
function :(FSI(permA, permB, D))
inter= multi intersect (permA, permB)
perm = inter/len(permA)
if perm > 0 then
SS=perm*D
end if
return SS
end function
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Table 3.1: Design Notation Table
Notation Definition
cd classes.dex
jc Java Class
f Java Function
o Instruction opcode
S Signature
P Pattern from a Signature
TOC −R(Pm, P n) Targeted Overlap
BUF Set of Targeted overlap Coefficients
T Threshold
D(SA, SB) Dice Cofficient
PermA Permission list from sample A
P.O(A,B) Targeted Permission Overlap
SS Final Similarity Index
MSI Minimum Similarity Index
PLT Pattern Level Threshold
3.4 Evaluation
We have implemented a prototype of OpSeq in Python to test its efficacy on
obfuscation techniques typically employed by Android malware. This section presents
our empirical results.
3.4.1 Focus of the Evaluation
The focus of the evaluation is twofold: 1) detection of known malware, and 2)
further categorization of detected malware into their respective malware families.
In particular, the evaluation targets the following two research questions:
1. Malware/Benign apps detection (Mal/Ben):
Can OpSeq accurately detect a variant of repackaged malicious code without
confusion with benign applications?
• True Positive (TP): known malware code is correctly detected.
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• False Positive (FP): benign code wrongly detected as containing malware
code.
• True Negative (TN): benign apps are not flagged as having malware code.
• False Negative (FN): known malware code is not detected.
2. Malware class detection (Mal Class):
Can OpSeq categorize a known repackaged malware code into its respective
family?
• True Positive (TP): all malware code that are correctly categorized.
• False Positive (FP): all malware code that are wrongly categorized as
variants of different family.
• False Negative (FN): all malware code that were not detected.
• True Negative (TN): true negative is eliminated in this test because all the
malware samples belong to at least one known class. The samples used in
this test were derived from the true positives in Mal/Ben above.
Experimental Dataset: We use two datasets for experiments. The first dataset
has 1,551 Android applications consisting of 359 benign applications downloaded from
Google Play, and 1,192 malware samples (of 25 families) from the well-known Android
Genome project [92]. The second dataset has 207 malware samples employing four
obfuscation techniques: reflection, encryption, code reordering and junk insertion.
DroidChameleon [63], and SandMark [45] are used to generate the samples. Specifi-
cally, malware sample distribution of DroidChameleon and SandMark are 167 variants
(of 25 malware classes), and 40 variants (of 20 malware classes) respectively. If only
one obfuscation technique is used by a malware, we refer it as simple obfuscation,
otherwise, it is referred as complex obfuscation. Table 3.2 presents the distribution
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Table 3.2: Malware sample distibution as per four obfuscation techniques: reflection,
encryption, code reordering, and junk insertion
Obfuscation Obfuscation Number of
Type Techniques Malware Samples
DroidChameleon
Encryption (E) 24
Simple Reflection (R) 25
Obfuscation Reordering (O) 24
Junk (J) 24
E & R 23
Complex E & R & O 24
Obfuscation E & R & J 23
SandMark
Transparent Branches 20
Random DeadCode 20
Total 207
of malware in the dataset in accordance with obfuscation tool and type.
3.4.2 Optimum Variables
As mentioned in the previous section, we chose to slice our normalized sequences
using 2-gram sub-sequences, based on results from empirical studies. The average
accuracy of our approach tested with unigram, 2-gram and 3-gram was 91%, 98.9%
and 96% respectively.
Furthermore, we have identified two variables necessary for our algorithm: 1)
Pattern-level threshold (PLT) - the minimum overlap ratio required to assume simi-
larity between two 2-gram patterns from different apps (in Pattern-level similarity),
and 2) Minimum similarity index (MSI) - the minimum score that determines if a
malware footprint is present in an application (in Final-similarity index). To get
the optimal values of PLT and MSI, we choose arbitrary values and plugged them
into our algorithm. The chosen values for PLT are 70, 80 and 90, all expressed as
a percentage. MSI values are 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, again expressed as a percentage. Our
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variables are chosen based on the statistics of Mal/Ben detection.
In choosing the optimal values, we use F-Score statistics. The F-Score measures
the overall accuracy of a test, which depends on precision and recall. Recall is the
measure of accuracy that a specific class has been detected (% of correct malware
families detected out of all malware samples), whereas precision is the percentage of
positive prediction (% of all malware detected out of all sample applications).
The combination of PLT and MSI that gives the highest F-score is the optimal
solution for the test data. We ran OpSeq on our dataset using the above combination
of PLT and MSI and the results of our execution is shown in Table 3.3. Each row (a
model) represents one combination. We then calculate the statistics (false positive,
false negative, true positive, true negative, precision, recall and F-score) for each
model. The equation for F-Score statistics is:
F = 2 * ((Precision * Recall)/(Precision + Recall)) (3.4.1)
The results in Table 3.3 above indicate the highest F-Score is attained with PLT
equal to 80% and MSI equal to 3%. This model gives us 99.3% precision, 98.5% recalls
and an F-Score of 98.9% for Mal/Ben detection. Furthermore, the false negative rate
(given as FN/TP+FN) for this model was ≈1.5%. This indicates our system has
a very small probability of “miss” detection for known malicious code. The false
positive rate for the same model is ≈2.2%.
Using the same metrics on Mal/Class, our F-Score accuracy was 97.5%, 98%
recall and 97% precision. Thus overall, our system is capable of accurately detecting
malware 98.9% of the time and can categorize the malware into its correct family
with 97.5% accuracy. The confusion matrix for Mal/Ben and Mal/Class based on the
optimal values is shown in Table 3.4 and Table 3.5, respectively.
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Table 3.3: Model Selection Result: F-Score, Precision, Recall
Model False False True True Precision Recall Interpolated F-Score
Positive Negative Positive Negative Precision
T 90M 7 0 68 1124 359 1 0.943 1 0.971
T 90M 6 1 63 1129 358 0.999 0.947 1 0.973
T 80M 7 0 63 1129 359 1 0.947 1 0.973
T 90M 5 2 55 1137 357 0.998 0.954 0.998 0.976
T 80M 6 2 54 1138 357 0.998 0.955 0.998 0.976
T 90M 4 2 44 1148 357 0.998 0.963 0.998 0.98
T 80M 5 2 42 1150 357 0.998 0.965 0.998 0.981
T 70M 6 25 31 1161 334 0.98 0.97 0.997 0.983
T 70M 7 10 35 1157 349 0.99 0.97 0.997 0.983
T 80M 4 5 34 1158 354 0.996 0.971 0.997 0.984
T 90M 3 4 34 1158 355 0.997 0.971 0.997 0.984
T 70M 4 108 22 1170 251 0.92 0.98 0.993 0.986
T 70M 5 52 27 1165 307 0.96 0.98 0.993 0.986
T 80M 3 8 18 1174 351 0.993 0.985 0.993 0.989
T 70M 3 192 15 1177 167 0.86 0.987 0.971 0.979
The rationale for choosing our optimal values is to further buttress the preci-
sion/recall curve of our solution as shown in Figure 3.2. With each point representing
one model, the points on the curve where precision and recall are around their
maximum and are nearly equal indicate the point of maximum accuracy (interpolated
precision is used to smooth the PR curve).
3.4.3 Empirical Results
Accuracy: Given the F-Score for Mal/Ben, our system can detect malware footprints
in an app with 98.9% accuracy. However due to some reasons identified below, the
Mal/Class test (i.e., identifying the class category) is slightly lower (97.5%). In
comparison with some recent known malware detection tools, OpSeq ’s Mal/Class
accuracy (97.5%) did better than Apposcopy [39] with 90% accuracy. On the other
hand DroidLegacy [30] recorded a membership test accuracy of 98%, slightly higher
than OpSeq ’s Mal/Class figure of 97.5%.
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Table 3.4: Mal/Ben Best Model Confusion Matrix
(Positive) (Negative)
Malware Benign Total
(Positive)
Malware 1174 8 1182
(Negative)
Benign 18 351 369
Total 1192 359
Table 3.5: Percentage of Mal/Class Prediction Result
Malware False False True Total
Family Negative Positive Positive
ADRD 0 0 22 22
Anserverbot 7 12 286 305
BeanBot 0 0 8 8
Bgserv 0 0 9 9
CruseWin 0 0 2 2
DroidDream 1 1 14 16
DroidDreamLight 4 0 43 47
DroidKungFu 5 19 418 442
Geinimi 0 0 69 69
GingerMaster 0 0 4 4
GoldDream 0 0 47 47
Gone60 0 0 9 9
GPSSMSSpy 0 0 6 6
HippoSMS 0 0 4 4
jSMSHider 0 0 13 13
KMin 0 0 52 52
Pjapps 1 2 55 58
Plankton 0 1 10 11
RogueLemon 0 0 2 2
RogueSPPush 0 0 9 9
SndApps 0 0 10 10
Tapsnake 0 0 2 2
YZHC 0 0 22 22
zHash 0 0 11 11
Zsone 0 0 12 12
Total 18 35 1139 1192
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Figure 3.2: Precision & Recall Curve
However, comparing DroidLegacy’s recall rate of 94%, which is the true positive
rate, versus our figure of 98%, indicates our system is capable of better detection.
Furthermore, our system has better coverage in terms of malware families processed
(they processed 11 families against ours with 25 families) and resiliency to different
obfuscators as shown in the next subsection.
False Negative: Eighteen (18) malware were incorrectly categorized as benign
apps. Samples from DroidKungFu, DroidDreamLight and Anserverbot constitute the
bulk of our false negative predictions as shown in Table 3.5. One reason for the false
negatives can be traced to our signature generation process. This process randomly
picks only one sample from a set to create a class signature; it is possible that the
sample might be the oldest, newest, or even a variant that has more inclusion or
exclusion of instructions within the malicious code. For instance, the sample we use
to generate the signature for DroidDreamLight is a newer version than the rest of its
variants. This sample has about 98 functions that were extracted for the signature
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against 18 for the older version. Thus, since our similarity calculates overlap based
on the target known profile, this sample was a miss.
Another reason for some false negatives can be attributed to native code exploits.
Malware samples that have most of their malicious code written in native code
will often result in a miss detection (e.g., some few variants of DroidKungFu and
Anserverbot). Currently, OpSeq is only designed to handle the dex file (containing
Java bytecode) and handling native code is the subject of ongoing research.
False Positives: For Mal/Ben, 8 applications out of 359 downloaded from
Google Play were detected as malware by OpSeq , as shown in Table 3.4. In order to
confirm the true nature of these 8 applications, we ran them through VirusTotal [7].
The output flagged 3 out the 8 apps as malware, reducing our true false positives to
only 5 apps.
In Mal/Class, the false positives recorded were largely due to the use of common
code snippets. This code ranges from 3rd party libraries to adware. Most of the
malware families originate from the same location and have common targets, so
it is not uncommon to find similar libraries and/or adware packaged within the
applications. For instance, we analyzed one of the Anserverbot samples which OpSeq
miscategorized as DroidKungFu. This miscategorization occurs as a result of the
presence of an adware library called - Adware.waps in the new Anserverbot sample
which was missing in the old version used to generate the familial signature. However,
the adware on its own collects various user data from a device and invokes some
sensitive APIs, like getRunningTask. Thus our system retrieved more features than
were available for its family’s signature. On the other hand, the DroidKungFu sample
for signature generation contains the same adware. Since OpSeq assigned the malware
class based on the strength of the final similarity index, that Anserverbot sample was
flagged as DroidKungFu.
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3.4.4 Evaluating Resiliency
Our approach can detect known malicious code obfuscated and repackaged within
another app. In other to measure its resiliency, we employ two different open source
obfuscators: DroidChameleon - newer and specifically designed to obfuscate Android
apps and SandMark - a well known and tested Java obfuscator. In both systems, we
gave special emphasis to those modules/algorithms that can severely hinder opcode-
sequence based detection.
Test against DroidChameleon Using DroidChameleon, we generated 167 obfus-
cated variants of the malware in our sample set with varying degrees of transforma-
tions, ranging from simple (one method) to complex (combination of obfuscators). In
this segment of evaluation we choose 4 common obfuscation techniques employed by
Android malware:
1. Encryption: names, strings and field encryption
2. Reflection: permission =-based API calls are changed from direct invocation
to using reflection API in helper classes
3. Junk Insertion: addition of “noise” instructions
4. Code Reordering: altering the flow of program execution by changing the
positions of unrelated instructions
In simple obfuscation, an application is transformed with just one technique e.g.,
getDeviceId is transformed from direct call to invoking a helper class that calls
class.getMethod() and then method.invoke(). In complex obfuscations applications
get obfuscated with two or three techniques e.g., all strings, fields and names are
encrypted and then all permission-based API calls are invoked using the reflection
API.
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For simple obfuscation, we introduced encryption into 24 samples, 25 samples
had added reflection, junk instructions were added in 24 samples, and code reordering
in 24 samples. For complex obfuscation our samples were transformed with a
minimum of two different techniques. We modified DroidChameleon such that when
an app is unpackaged, it is first encrypted, then the bytecode is run through more
obfuscator modules before repackaging. We successfully repackaged 23 samples with
encryption and reflection, 24 had (encryption, reflection and reordering) combined
and finally 23 had (encryption, reflection and junk) combined. Our results for
simple and complex obfuscation as shown in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7, respectively.
OpSeq scores 100% average detection rate in simple obfuscation and 88% for complex
transformations.
AntiVirus Results Using the same obfuscated samples mentioned above, we
assessed the detection ratio of other antivirus products using the VirusTotal website.
For simple obfuscation, out of the top 14 antivirus products, AVG recorded the
highest detection rate with average detection of 65.83%, followed by Dr. Web, F-
Secure, Kaspersky, AhnLab-V3 with slightly above 50%, and Panda, with the lowest
detection rate of 4%. In the complex obfuscation cases, AhnLab-V3 led other antivirus
products with a detection rate of 49.33%, then AVG with 27%. All the rest recorded
less than 25%.
DroidLegacy Results We also used the same obfuscated variants described above
to evaluate the performance of DroidLegacy. We set the optimum threshold of 0.7
as specified in their paper. For simple obfuscation, DroidLegacy had an average
detection rate of 37% and 0% for complex obfuscation. Like many common malware
detection tools, DroidLegacy depends on API names to create signatures for malware.
In situations where the name is obfuscated using reflection, chances of detection
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Table 3.6: Evaluation results for DroidChameleon’s simple obfuscation.
Encryption Reflection Reordering Junk Average
Detection Rate
Total No. of Sample 24 25 24 24
Research Tools
OpSeq 24 25 24 24 100
DroidLegacy 6 0 15 15 37.5
AntiVirus Software
AVG 8 20 18 18 65.98
DrWeb 17 5 17 17 57.73
F-Secure 6 16 17 16 56.7
Kaspersky 6 16 16 15 54.64
AhnLab-V3 14 14 10 12 51.55
Avast 6 15 13 14 49.48
Avira 5 7 12 12 37.11
Symantec 4 12 7 11 35.05
Ad-Aware 6 6 7 7 26.8
BitDefender 6 6 7 7 26.8
AVware 5 6 6 6 23.71
McAfee 5 5 5 5 20.62
Panda 2 2 2 2 8.25
Baidu-International 1 1 1 1 4.12
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Table 3.7: Evaluation results for DroidChameleon’s complex obfuscation.
Encryption & Encryption Encryption Average
Reflection Reflection & Reflection & Detection Rate
Reordering Junk
Total No. of Sample 23 24 23
Research Tools
OpSeq 23 24 15 88.57
DroidLegacy 0 0 0 0
AntiVirus Software
AhnLab-V3 12 13 12 49.33
AVG 6 7 6 27.14
Kaspersky 6 6 4 22.86
Ad-Aware 6 7 3 22.86
BitDefender 6 7 3 22.86
F-Secure 6 7 3 21.33
Avast 6 6 3 21.43
Avira 5 5 3 18.57
AVware 5 5 3 18.57
DrWeb 5 5 3 18.57
McAfee 5 5 3 18.57
Symantec 4 4 2 14.29
Panda 2 1 2 7.14
Baidu-International 1 2 2 7.14
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become very low. This explains why it recorded 0% for all apps that were repackaged
using reflective method invocation. Furthermore, it performed poorly with encryption
alone, detecting only 6 out of 24 encrypted apps.
Tests against Sandmark To further evaluate the resilience of OpSeq against
major obfuscation techniques, we tested it against SandMark. SandMark is well
known and highly documented tool used for watermarking, tamper-proofing and code
obfuscation of Java bytecode [45]. For the purpose of our analysis, we used only
some specific modules within Obfuscation Executive to transform the application
bytecode. We generated 40 new variants by inserting: Transparent Branches and
Random DeadCode. The resulting new jar files were repackaged, aligned and signed
before analysis.
In this experiment, we tested OpSeq ’s similarity detection capability by per-
forming a one to one comparison between each of the 40 repackaged malware, and
its original sample. The results indicates OpSeq can detect these obfuscations with
100% accuracy.
3.4.5 Measure of Performance
Our experimental system an Ubuntu Linux 64-bit system running on an Intel Xeon
CPU at 2.5 GHz, with 16 GB RAM. We leverage an open source Android reverse
engineering tool called apktool for the conversion of the Android dex file into an
intermediate bytecode representation, called smali. Given a target application with
205 Java functions (28624 lines of Dalvik bytecode), for which 46 of these functions
invokes one or more of the sensitive APIs, it takes an average of 4.5 seconds on our
test machine to perform a one-to-one similarity matching with a known sample that
has 118 Java methods (19307 lines of Dalvik instructions).
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Furthermore, for detection purposes, it takes an average of 11.6 seconds to
analyze a target app against known profiles of the 25 malware families (classification).
This results outperforms Apposcopy, which took an average of 346 seconds per
analysis of an app with 26786 lines of Dalvik bytecode.
The fact that OpSeq is designed to fingerprint apps based on small structured
signatures extracted from vital points within the program code base helps to eliminate
unnecessary noise in the matching process and thus improves our system’s overall
performance.
3.5 Discussion
The experiments in the previous section illustrate that for a large class of Android
malware, OpSeq significantly outperforms state of the art commercial and research
products that rely on signature-based detection algorithms. Our tests indicate that
OpSeq is effective in detecting malware in the presence of both simple and complex
obfuscation techniques, many of which compromise the accuracy of existing detection
techniques.
In the malware families we analyzed, the largest stored signature has 118
patterns (slices) to be matched while the smallest has 3 patterns. Theoretically,
if we compare OpSeq with other opcode-sequence based detection like [90, 44] which
slice the entire app’s opcode-sequence into n slices, our app’s signature sizes are
guaranteed to be smaller and therefore much more efficient. Furthermore, our average
processing time of 11.6 seconds per 25 family comparison indicates our algorithm is
fairly scalable.
During the course of our analysis, our findings reveal extensive code reuse
amongst some of the malware families. For instance, Zhou et al has categorized
DroidKungFu into 5 major families [92]. However we found malware from these classes
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to contain a considerable amount of common code segments. Thus we categorize them
as one class.
Also, Anserverbot and Basebridge were found to contain a similar main package
com.keji.danti. They differ slightly where BaseBridge loads an extra payload that
leads to privilege escalation while some Anserverbot variants do not. But since OpSeq
only processes the dex file, our analyses flag one as a variant of the other. Information
from Foresafe encyclopedia [8] and analysis results of some antivirus products in
VirusTotal also affirm their relationship; hence we merge them into one class. Some
common adware and external libraries were also found to be present in malware of
different families. Such instances have increased the rate of our false positives and
affect the overall accuracy for Mal Class detection, but these issues also raise indicate
that OpSeq has significant value in better malware classification as well as detection.
3.6 System Limitations
Like most malware detection schemes based on static analysis, OpSeq can be thwarted
via whole class encryption and extensive dynamic class loading. This is because OpSeq
only extracts features from the available classes.dex file. Extra classes that are fully
encrypted or loaded at runtime cannot be processed.
Code-reordering that can split functions into multiple sub-functions may also
negatively impact our approach. Also, very large numbers of junk instructions can
introduce so much noise that it may affect the quality of our signatures. However
these obfuscation techniques will only be problematic when more than one sensitive
functional module is tampered with, which in practice will require significant human
intervention. Furthermore, since our approach clusters common opcodes together by
normalizing them before we slice the whole sequence into 2-gram patterns, excessive
noise can only affect our signature when unique opcodes are introduced viz-a-viz
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the normalization pattern. These unique opcodes must vary significantly from those
normally used within the functions.
Finally, like all static fingerprinting algorithms, OpSeq is designed based on
signature of a known sample to detect its variant. This system cannot analyze
unknown samples. Thus in the next two chapters we will discuss a further contribution
of this thesis, involving design of a hybrid analysis system that will augment some of
the limitations of OpSeq .
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Chapter 4
Instrumentation
Instrumentation is the process of analyzing programs by adding trace code to their
source code, binary code, or execution environment. This provides mechanisms for an
analyst to define concerns related to program verification, enforcement, monitoring,
error-checking, performance, debugging, or tracing. Instrumentation techniques
do not necessarily modify code but rather tamper with the execution or behavior
based on defined constructs. In recent years, instrumentation techniques have
gained momentum in the cybersecurity community for vulnerability [83], malware
[15, 31, 32, 35, 51, 62] and privacy analysis [18, 19, 50, 84].
Aspect oriented programming (AOP), first introduced by [55], is a modularized
programming model allowing the separation of cross cutting concerns [73], which
are difficult to capture in traditional programming models. AOP encapsulates the
concerns, defined as aspects, by instrumenting extra behavior in the existing code.
These aspects are special constructs forming the building blocks of AOP. Their designs
can be generic, which allows for reuse throughout program execution. Implementation
of AOP can be performed in two distinct ways:
1. Static instrumentation allows for code to be injected at compile time. This
technique merges both the aspects and the original code into one binary, which
then executes in the execution environment of the original code.
40
2. Dynamic instrumentation, on the other hand, injects code at runtime. In
most instances, this requires a custom classloader to enable the interpreter to
understand and implement the AOP features.
In 2001 [54], PARC developed an extension for AOP designed specifically for
the Java programming language, called AspectJ. Its Java-like syntax, coupled with
its ease of use, makes AspectJ a very popular instrumentation tool for Java programs.
Aspects in AOP are defined by some key terms:
1. Pointcuts are defined by kinded constructs such as function call, method
execution, within class, cflow etc., which match some specified signatures
or modifiers.
2. Signatures are semantic definitions which can be decoded by the AspectJ
compiler during joinpoint creation. It can encapsulate both broad and narrow
definitions, giving an analyst ample flexibility.
3. Joinpoints are points within the execution of the program that are interesting
and/or defined by the concerns of an analyst. These are chosen based on
constructs defined in a pointcut.
4. Advice is the piece of code that gets executed when a certain joinpoint is reached
during program execution
In addressing security concerns, advice defined for a joinpoint adds some func-
tionalities such as logging, code injection, value manipulations, execution rerouting,
skipping execution, etc. to an instrumented program. Advice to be executed can
target before, after and around the execution of a particular joinpoint. As the
name implies, execution of before advice precedes the execution of the target
joinpoint. In this advice, parameters and the target object can be retrieved, in
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addition to signatures, source location, etc. For after advice, in addition to
the information extracted in before advice, the return value can also be retrieved
and evaluated. The most interesting is around advice which, although potentially
expensive to use, allows code injection and modification of arguments, variable values,
and return values.
The code snippet in Listing 4.1 shows a sample aspect that defines a pointcut
which picks a joinpoint at the call to getDeviceId. When instrumented, this aspect
will pick the method getDeviceId from the class TelephonyManager. The joinpoint is
picked because the signature matches the method in that class and it is the only class
in the Android SDK with such a method. However, if within the application there
also exists a library class with such a method, our broad signature will automatically
capture such a joinpoint, too.
Listing 4.1: Simple Aspect
public aspect Logger{
pointcut myId():
call(* *..*.getDeviceId());
after()returning(String id): myId(){
log.v("AspectJ", "DeviceId="+id);
}
}
4.0.1 Bytecode Weaving
In the Java compilation process, an intermediate representation called bytecode is
generated when the original source code is compiled. This bytecode is contained in
.class files representing each source class. More specific to Android, the system has
added another level of abstraction to its compilation process, where the class files
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are further compressed into one dex file. Bytecode weavers are tasked with weaving
together class files (both Java classes and aspect classes). In this research, our chosen
bytecode weaver is AspectJ [55]. Its robust framework allows us to define and inject
security concerns related to Android apps for the purpose of logging and monitoring.
Furthermore, its programming syntax and semantics are identical to that of the Java
language, allowing us to tie and weave the monitoring code into a target Android
application with better precision.
AspectJ compilers (ajc) can accept both raw sources and class files for compile-
time weaving and thus have the capability to compile and weave the aspect/Java
sources and/or class files to produce a new woven class. The resulting merged
Java bytecode has to be compatible with the execution platform’s VM. However, in
load-time weaving AspectJ exposes an interface that facilitates the weaving process
between the target bytecode and a custom classloader.
The requirements of our system involve analyzing unknown binaries where there
is no available source code. Thus we limit the discussions in this thesis to only compile-
time bytecode weaving. This form of static instrumentation takes the advice defined
in an aspect and weaves them at specified jointpoints as ilustrated in Figure 4.1.
For Android apps, the resulting binary is dexed and re-packaged into a new apk.
Since this new application does not need a custom classloader, it has the flexibility
of executing on any device emulator without changes to the underlying OS.
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Figure 4.1: OpSeq Signature Generation Workflow
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Chapter 5
Hybrid Analysis
5.1 AspectDroid
As mentioned in the previous chapter, static analysis involves detecting known
malicious applications using predetermined signatures and other semantic artifacts,
while dynamic analysis understands program behavior by executing it in a contained
environment. As malicious apps evolve over time, signature-based static analysis
techniques alone are not sufficient to detect stealthy obfuscated variants and/or new
malware samples. Hence, we explored the concept of bytecode weaving to develop a
better analysis system.
Most comprehensive dynamic analysis techniques either require instrumentation
of the underlaying operating system code [32, 62, 31] or involve virtual machine
introspection [82]. They provide effective sandboxing for the analysis of the target
applications, but unfortunately, such techniques are heavily dependent on OS versions
and the Android runtime. Porting and flashing a new build on real devices for various
versions of Android is not an easy task, which can limit the number and kind of
applications that can be analyzed. Existing application-level techniques like [15, 18,
19, 35, 51] are mostly constrained to performing only API monitoring. Although
systems like Capper[84, 83] can perform app-level taint analysis, the heavy reliance
on static analysis for the extraction of taint slices makes it equally vulnerable to
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simple obfuscation.
In this chapter, we present AspectDroid , a hybrid analysis system for Android
applications based on the AspectJ instrumentation framework. AspectDroid performs
static bytecode instrumentation at the application level, and does not require any
particular support from the operating system or the Dalvik virtual machine. It weaves
in monitoring code at compile time using a set of predefined security concerns, such as
data/resource abuse and other non-traditional behaviors like reflective calls and native
code execution. The target application is then executed on any Android platform of
choice for which behavioral patterns are monitored and logged dynamically.
5.2 Related Work
5.2.1 Application-level instrumentation
The first application-level dynamic taint tracking on Android was developed by
[84, 83]. Their system (Capper) is designed to monitor exfiltration of sensitive
data from source to sink. However, their work requires significant static analysis
to refactor the Java bytecode and compute taint slices which are used at runtime as
the taint propagation map. This system is prone to most of the inaccuracies of static
taint tracking that can result from simple obfuscation techniques. More so, data
sources, propagation, and sinks that pass through reflective call invocation are not
processed if the invoked class and method names cannot be statically resolved. And
finally, like most app-level analysis systems, Capper does not handle dynamic class
instrumentation. Our system AspectDroid on the other hand can perform better data
flow analysis since it can handle Java reflection and runtime class instrumentation.
Other research efforts that exist which target app-level instrumentation are
[15, 18, 19, 35, 51]. The authors of Droidox developed APImonitor[15] to counter
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its numerous porting issues. ApiMonitor like [18], [19], RV-Droid [35] and [51] all
use static bytecode instrumentation to analyze method calls in target applications
at runtime. Although they use different instrumentation frameworks, these systems
are all limited to sensitive API monitoring during program execution. In contrast,
AspectDroid is a complete analysis system that targets security concerns such as data
flow analysis, sensitive API monitoring, as well as analytics of suspicious behaviors.
5.2.2 Low-Level Instrumentation
Most Android dynamic analysis tools are developed by instrumenting the operating
system code and/or the underlying framework. TaintDroid [32] is a real time dynamic
taint tracking system that monitors the flow of sensitive data. It uses some basic
data flow rules to track the movement of tainted variables, method files and IPC
messages from sources until they reach a specified Java library sink.
Several extensions to TaintDroid [31, 62, 78] were built with added function-
alities. DroidBox [31], for instance, logs an app’s activities related to starting
services, broadcast receivers, SMS and calls made, cryptography operations performed
using the Android API, and file read/write operations, irrespective of taint marking.
Andrubis [78] is an automated analysis system that combines both static and
dynamic approaches to an app’s analysis. Applications submitted via an online
link are dynamically examined on a QEMU-based emulation environment for method
tracking, system level analysis, and data exfiltration using TaintDroid. Other systems
like AppsPlayground [62] added more functionality such as kernel level-monitoring
and automated testing to TaintDroid. The critical design rule for these approaches
relies on low-level instrumentation, thus making them very OS version-dependent
and in some cases platform-dependent. It is important to note that TaintDroid based
systems depend fully on the Dalvik virtual machine and as such will require a complete
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make-over to port to the new Android runtime. More so, stealthy malware can often
detect emulation environments which may result in inaccurate analysis. Lastly, due
to significant requirements for expert knowledge to port from version to version, the
capacities of such systems for long term analysis is very limited.
Other host-based dynamic analysis tools are DroidScope, AASandbox and
Crowdroid. DroidScope [82] uses virtual machine introspection to monitor the activity
of untrusted applications. This system performs API tracing, native instruction and
Dalvik tracing, and taint tracking. AASanbox [22], on the other hand, evaluates
system call logs by placing hooks between kernel space and user space. These hooks
hijack the system calls made and log information such as process ID, syscall name and
execution time. CrowDroid [26] analyzes system calls performed by an application
based on logs collected using the strace debugging utility in a lightweight CrowdClient.
This system is limited to extracting only Linux-specific information like open files,
but cannot give broad information on IPC and Android specific data.
Dynamic binary instrumentation (DBI) systems like DynamicRIO [24], PIN
[57], Spike [76], and Dyninst [25] which performs runtime monitoring, are mostly
dependent on low level system C instructions. Furthermore, with the exception of
PIN, the remaining are not applicable to ARM systems. DBI techniques are also
very dependent on the underlying hardware architecture and as such will require
modification of the operating system in the case of Android app analysis.
5.3 System Design
AspectDroid is a hybrid system that uses static instrumentation to inject monitoring
code into the target app based on some specific cross-cutting concerns. A requirement
of our system is the ability to analyze unknown binaries where there is no available
source code. The core of AspectDroid is built based on compile-time bytecode
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weaving. This form of static instrumentation takes the advice defined in an aspect
and weaves them at specified joinpoints in a target class file. For Android apps, the
resulting binary is dexed and re-packaged into a new apk. Since this new application
does not need a custom classloader, it has the flexibility of executing on any device
emulator without changes to the underlying OS.
With AspectDroid , the new injected code executes alongside the original code
and performs custom logging and other analytical functions. The instrumentation
engine (IE) which is the primary component, forms the backbone of AspectDroid and
is designed to address three objectives:
1. Dataflow Analysis
2. Resource Abuse Tracing
3. Analytics of Suspicious Behavior
Our instrumentation code is encapsulated in an aspect and is tailored for each
of the objectives mentioned above. The aspects are weaved into the target app using
AspectJ’s ajc compiler, producing the instrumented version used to perform the
analysis. The instrumentation process is done in-vitro on a host machine. After
successful re-compilation the target app is then pushed onto the test bed for dynamic
execution.
5.3.1 Dataflow Analysis
AspectDroid performs application-level tainting of target data source(s). Our ap-
proach is built around the fact that standard Java and Android libraries use specific
method naming conventions to express common types of operations. Thus, we utilize
the consistent use of specific verbs, such as read, open, write, put, connect, and
execute, to define broad signatures to capture actions such as file/stream/network
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Figure 5.1: Parts of a Method Joinpoint
access. More specific signatures, such as getLongitude are used to define narrower
joinpoints. Based on all the signatures, we define pointcuts to select various source,
sink, propagation joinpoints. With the help of AspectJ APIs, a joinpoint’s data,
such as the target object, parameters, return values, etc. (as shown in Figure
5.1) can be extracted at runtime. Java programming semantics categorize data types
as primitive, object, and arrays. Although beyond the scope of this thesis, it is
important to note that the JVM stores and processes these data types very differently.
Therefore, our data sources, propagation and sink for each data type are handled
differently. To simplify the terminology, we refer to primitive data types, such as
string and character, as low-level data types.
Our dataflow analysis is limited to explicit propagation, where the tainted data
must be in the sink call, as shown in Listing 5.1. On the other hand, Listing 5.2
illustrates an example of an implicit flow which exfiltrates inferred data based on the
real tainted data.
Listing 5.1: Explicit Data Flow
TelephonyManager telephonyManager = (TelephonyManager)
getSystemService(Context.TELEPHONY_SERVICE);
String IMEI = telephonyManager.getDeviceId();
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if (!IMEI.equals("00000000"){
String id = Base64.encodeToString(myString.getBytes(), 0);
SmsManager sms = SmsManager.getDefault();
sms.sendTextMessage("5556", null,id, null, null);
}
Listing 5.2: Implicit Data Flow
TelephonyManager telephonyManager = (TelephonyManager)
getSystemService(Context.TELEPHONY_SERVICE);
String IMEI = telephonyManager.getDeviceId();
if (!IMEI.equals("00000000"){
String val = "Device not emulator";
SmsManager sms = SmsManager.getDefault();
sms.sendTextMessage("5556", null,val, null, null);
}
Although, AspectJ API used by our system is not designed to create joinpoints
on conditional/branch instructions thus making it hard to capture implicit flow.
Nonetheless, in the analysis of Android applications, sensitive data leaving the device
is the real threat, not inferred data. As illustrated in Listing 5.1, the real device IMEI
was exfiltrated compared to “Device not Emulator” in Listing 5.2.
Taint sources
We are interested in sources that are relevant to the privacy and security of the user.
We define vital sources as phone-related data, content provider objects, file reads,
and user input. In Android, most important data are guarded by permissions and
only accessible to the user through specialized Android API calls. Other relevant data
not guarded by permissions, such as data read from files and user input from text
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boxes, are also accessed via the standard Java/Android APIs. Specialized pointcuts
are created using signatures to intercept these vital API calls. After execution, the
return value is stored as a key in a taint map with a corresponding special tag for
each unique source as the value. Depending on the return type, low-level data types
are stored in raw form, while every other object is stored in hash form. This storage
design is very significant in reducing the overhead associated with checking if tainted
data is part of an object. It allows us to check if the object is tainted using its
hashcode at propagation or sink joinpoints.
Taint sinks
Taint sinks are defined as points where the target application communicates with
an external component, either within the device or the outside world. In our data
flow analysis, we seek to monitor only those sinks that form a possible exfiltration
point for the data sources defined above. The data sinks are broadly categorized as
network, e.g., writing to a Socket, URLConnection, etc.; SMS sends; file writes (both
ordinary files and shared preferences); and IPC. We use the same signature semantics
to pick the sink joinpoints. We also leverage the around advice of such joinpoints
to check if its arguments, or target, contain tainted data.
This process is straightforward for parameters. For example; if the sink call is a
sendTextMessage(..), the tainted data will be checked against the parameters of this
joinpoint. However, for a target object we need to parse it and check the associated
fields against the keys in the taint map. For example; if the tainted data is appended
to a URL, and then a URLConnection is created from that URL object, which then
invokes its getOutputStream() method. Our system parses the URLConnection
object to get the URL field and compare that against the data in our taint map.
Overall, data exfiltration is detected if a tainted piece of data is found either within
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the sink joinpoint’s parameters/parameter’s fields or within the target/target’s fields.
Taint Propagation
Knowing data sources and sinks alone cannot accurately determine data exfiltration;
we also need to identify the data propagation process as represented by the sequence of
variable assignments along the path from source to sink. The tainted data can be part
of an object’s fields and the object can be manipulated in different ways. For every
joinpoint, we determine if it contains tainted data; if so, the appropriate propagation
rule is picked based on the respective joinpoint’s return type, as enumerated in the 7
point rules below:
1. Rule 1: Joinpoint that returns a low-level data type and contains a tainted
argument.
2. Rule 2: Joinpoint that returns a low-level data type and contains a tainted
target.
3. Rule 3: Joinpoints that convert a tainted array to other data types.
4. Rule 4: Joinpoints that create an array from other tainted data types.
5. Rule 5: Object constructor joinpoint that contains a tainted argument.
6. Rule 6: All joinpoints with object return type that contains tainted arguments.
7. Rule 7: All joinpoints with object return type that contains a tainted target.
For joinpoints targeting low-level data types, their return values and target object
are the same. However, for object joinpoints, the target is always a reference to
the location of the object in memory while the return type could be anything. For
example, an object’s joinpoint could return a Boolean indicating success of a method
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Table 5.1: Flow rules examples for updating taint/tag map
Rules joinpoint Example Taint Data Taint Tag/Map Update
Rule 1 Int myInt = System.identityHashCode(val) valueOf(val), tag = DeviceID valueOf(myInt), tag = DeviceID
Rule 2 String str1 = myInt.toString() valueOf(myInt), tag = DeviceId valueOf(str1), tag = DeviceID
Rule 3 char arr[] = str1.toCharArray() valueOf(str1), tag = DeviceID Hashcode(arr), tag = DeviceID
Elements of arr, tag = DeviceID
Rule 4 Str str2=Arrays.toString(arr) Hashcode(arr), tag = DeviceID valueOf(str2), tag = DeviceID
Rule 5 StringBuilder stb = new StringBuilder(str2) valueOf(str2), tag = DeviceID Hashcode(stb), tag = DeviceID
Rule 6 stb.append(val2) Hashcode(stb), tag = DeviceID HashCode(stb)
valueOf(val2) tag = LineNum tag = DeviceID and LineNum
Rule 7 Vector vec = new Vector() New empty vector is created
vec.add(str2) valueOf(str2), tag = DeviceID Hashcode(vec), tag = DeviceID
call, void, a low-level data type, or other objects. This distinction forms the basis
of how our taint tag/map is updated after the execution of the joinpoint. Table 5.1
gives a taint propagation example for each of the flow rules, and shows the taint
tag/map update after the joinpoint’s execution. Propagation rule 7 can create a
weaving process that might get out of hand, thus we included some optimizations for
joinpoints associated with that rule, based on the object’s class.
To optimize the weaving process and reduce the complexity of the instrumen-
tation, the propagation’s joinpoints for every source are created along the control
flow path of its enclosing method. For example, if the data source IMEI returned by
getDeviceId is found within the body of an Activity’s onCreate method, then the
propagation joinpoints will only be created for methods that satisfy the propagation
rules above and are in that control flow. This optimization greatly enhances our
weaving process and eliminates the need for redundant joinpoints.
5.3.2 Resource Abuse Tracing
Access to some vital functionalities such as Telephony (SMS and Calls) on the mobile
devices are requested through specialized API calls. According to a 2012 Trend
Micro report [74], resource abuse is the most common category of Android malware.
Thus it is imperative for an analysis system to trace and report such abuse. With
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AspectDroid , the system instruments the telephony method’s invocations and have
their target object, parameters and return value are logged. This information is
significant in determining the phone number used (premium service or device contact),
the message content, settings, and format.
5.3.3 Analytics of Suspicious Behaviors
Programming practices such as native call invocation, dynamic class loading, native
code execution, and reflective call invocation add flexibility to software development.
Although these concepts may be benign, malware can often hide its behavior using
these practices to hinder static analysis or for malicious purposes such as privilege
escalation.
Reflection, for instance, allows method calls to be resolved dynamically at
runtime. Malware can use this technique to hide calls to sensitive APIs. With
AspectDroid , we instrument reflective calls and analyze the target object at runtime
for possible tainted data sources, propagation, sinks, or any sensitive API calls. We
also check parameter arrays for possible taint propagation.
Android apps can load extra classes at runtime using a dynamic class loading
API. One of the drawbacks of static bytecode instrumentation (and by extension
all static analysis) is that only available classes are processed at compile time;
extra classes loaded at runtime are not affected by the weaving. To address this,
AspectDroid implements dynamic class instrumentation: at the joinpoint where
Dexclassloader loads the new dex file, the weaved advice captures the absolute
path to the file, sends it to the host machine via an Asynchronous task, and waits
for notification to proceed. On the host machine, AspectDroid has a server side
component that receives the dynamic class, instruments it, and pushes it back to its
original path on the testbed. Although this wait time slows down the process, it
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Figure 5.2: AspectDroid Implementation architecture
considerably expands the code coverage of our analysis.
AspectDroid also logs native code invocation, both for simple processes like
Logcat or through the Java native interface. Although it does not trace the activities
within the native code, it does log the name, object, parameters, and return value.
5.4 Implementation
5.4.1 Prototype implementation
We implemented a working prototype of our system in Python, Java, and PHP. The
instrumentation engine is setup on a host machine (64-bit Ubuntu system) for the
initial dex weaving and dynamic class instrumentation. Our software dependencies
includes external tools; dex2jar[23], AspectJ-ajc [10] compiler version 1.8, and
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external libraries; Apache Web Server[2], aspectjweaver[10], Apache Commons[9]
and Android SDK[14]. Our experiments were carried out on both a physical device
(a rooted Motorola Droid2 with Android 2.2) and two emulated devices (Android
4.1.2 and 4.4.2). The execution environments are loaded with text messages, calls,
contacts, one Gmail account, and some browser history.
Helper component
AspectDroid includes a “helper” component containing modules that automate key
actions. In particular, it implements unpacking, re-packaging and application signing.
Android applications are written in Java and compiled into a compressed class called
classes.dex. However, the AspectJ compiler does not understand the dex file
format, thus the need for decompression before weaving. We use a popular open
source tool called dex2jar, which takes an application file (.apk) or classes.dex
as input and outputs a jar file containing individual .class files. When the target
application is unpacked, it can be weaved together with desired aspects. After the
instrumentation process, the class files are repackaged (dexed and zipped) and re-
signed into an Android-compatible app using jar2dex and versign respectively.
Automated testing
Unlike many traditional applications, smartphone apps are mostly event-driven and
exhibit their true functionalities based on user interactions and in response to system
events. For example, forcing an SMS to be received so that a broadcast receiver can
be activated is an important system event that needs to triggered for us to observe
SMS abuse.
In the case of bulk analysis, manual execution of apps and triggering such
events can be time-consuming. One of the drawbacks of dynamic analysis is code
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coverage and a single execution path corresponding to a single app execution, whereby
information obtained may not necessarily represent the complete behavior of the
target app. Our assumption is the more a tool can explore an app, the more
information about the app’s behavior can be obtained. For that reason, we build
into AspectDroid an automated testing module as Python scripts which trigger a
series of system and user events to more fully exercise an app’s functionality. This
module combines some open source tools together with custom-built instrumentation
programs. These events are designed to mirror real-life events on a regular Android
device. They include:
1. App installation and activation of its main activity, as specified in the manifest,
using adb.
2. Random keystrokes that simulate user touch and gestures on the app using
monkey.
3. A user’s input is simulated where necessary within the instrumentation frame-
work. EditText user inputs can be associated with different input types.
Most developers specify input types as provided by the Android API – email,
password, etc. We make a best effort to generate data to match its possible
input type. This program is attached to the body of the instrumentation code.
4. SMS, calls and device settings are generated and manipulated using
uiautomator while GPS coordinates are simulated and triggered on the em-
ulator by telnet.
Independent testing frameworks like Android Monkey are limited to only
random application touches and gestures. With our automated testing, the simulated
user input built on the EditText-SetText method automatically creates the needed
textbox data during analysis, which proves to be very important. For example, if an
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EditText is expecting an email, if the Ok button is hit using Monkey, the application
may return an error and program execution may not proceed due to an empty text.
But with our injected input text, execution will proceed without an error.
Other vital parts of this testing module built with uiautomator help with forcing
various system’s event like calls, which would otherwise have to be done manually.
5.5 Testing and Evaluation
Our approach seeks to provide analysts with an easier to use and more flexible system
for application analysis. It is capable of examining and monitoring Android appli-
cations without restriction based on version and/or platform while still maintaining
a very high level of accuracy. The objectives of the evaluation were to quantify the
following aspects of the system’s performance:
1. Accuracy. We tested the accuracy of our data flow algorithm on 105 applications
from the DroidBench corpus.
2. App Analysis. We further evaluate the effectiveness of our system by comparing
the behavioral patterns in 100 real malware families from the Drebin dataset and
a set of 100 apps downloaded from Google Play. We examine data exfiltration,
telephony abuse, reflective invocation, dynamic class loading, and native code
execution.
3. Execution overhead. We measured the cost associated with dynamic execution
of the target app post-instrumentation.
5.5.1 Accuracy of Data Flow Algorithm
DroidBench 2.0 [17] is an open source project consisting of 120 simulated Android
applications used for testing analysis tools. These applications evaluate the accuracy
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of an algorithm in detecting data flow between a source and a sink. The authors
employ different methods of data manipulation, such as callbacks, arrays, application
lifecycle, inter-application communication, loops, reflection, threading, and implicit
flows to hide the flow of sensitive data. The apps are relatively small and they may
not necessarily be representative of real life apps and/or malware in terms of size.
However, they contain a wide spectrum of diverse, tricky data flow paths that can
be employed by malicious and/or over-privileged applications, thus making them a
corpus of interest to test AspectDroid .
Before executing the apps with AspectDroid , we execute the untampered dataset
to determine if they are running correctly and producing expected results. Out of 120,
15 apps failed to execute correctly in our environment due to either permission errors
or other bugs and were excluded from the analysis. The remaining 105 apps were
instrumented using our AspectDroid prototype. All apps were tested on emulator
version 4.4 using the automated testing module except for the three apps from the
emulator detection group, which were retested on the physical phone.
Based on the original source code for the 105 apps, the ground truth indicates
86 apps have data leaks and 19 apps have no leaks. Our experiments show that
AspectDroid yielded 80 true positive (TP) results, 16 true negative, 3 false negative,
and 6 false positive. Thus, the AspectDroid ’s recall is 96.4%, precision is 93.02%,
and the standard F-measure stands at 94.68%. Subsequent analysis showed that
in the three false negative cases, tainted and untainted data were added to a data
structure, then the app sinks only the untainted data. Our algorithm taints an
object that contains a tainted field, entry or element and does not handle removal
of that data/object from the taint map once it is written. Since the untainted data
is still part of a tainted object, we recorded a false positive. With respect to the
six false positives, four were apps with the following propagation paths: Public API
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Field1, StartProcessWithSecret and Implicit Flows. Our data flow algorithm
taints by means of data comparison (possible taint with items on taint map), thus
data exfiltration that is not explicit cannot be detected. The remaining two under
tainting were a result of an optimization added to our propagation rule in order to
reduce the effect of over-weaving (which results in too much additional code added to
the application). This optimization is a tradeoff between the effect of over-weaving
and a possible false negative; hence, these two false results are avoidable.
5.5.2 App Analysis
To test the effectiveness of AspectDroid for analyzing Android applications for
violations of security and privacy concerns, we used malware samples from the Drebin
[16] dataset, a corpus comprising 179 malware families. In our experiments, we picked
one sample per family from the top 100 families. For the non-malicious samples, we
downloaded 100 Android apps from Google Play. All 200 samples are instrumented,
recompiled and executed using our automated testing module.
In our prototype we tagged 27 important data sources, including phone related
data (IMEI, IMSI, ICCID, line Number and location data), user data (database
queries), and input data. We also created joinpoints on some sensitive APIs that
perform telephony functions, native code execution, dynamic class loading, and
reflection invocation. The data flow and sensitive API traces created after each app
execution are then parsed using a Python script to obtain the aggregated result.
We categorize the analysis result into 4 groups: data exfiltration, telephony abuse,
reflection and dynamic class loading, and native code execution.
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Data Exfiltration
Malware and to a large extent privacy-agnostic applications often target user and/or
phone related data either with malicious intent, for advertisement or identification
purposes. Most sensitive data are guarded by one-time permissions (for Android
versions 1-5) that gives an app open access to quite a large group of data on a
device e.g., Phone-State permission. We define exfiltration as unauthorized writes of
sensitive data to a file (log, sharedprefs, user-defined files), network, and SMS that
are not explicitly granted by the user at the point of transfer. Our analysis of the 100
malware samples showed 127 explicit data exfiltration paths of the 27 tainted sources
carried out by 23 samples. Our results showed IMEI, IMSI, ICCID, and LN are the
most widely exfiltrated phone data. This is followed by contacts, call logs, and SMS
from user-related data. SharedPref and network are the most common sink calls we
noted while SMS seems to be the least. For the Google Play apps, we observed 25
exfiltration paths, most of which are location and phone IMEI. Network is the sink
path for all these data leaks.
Telephony Abuse
SMS is one of the most widely abused resources on Android smartphones. Out of the
100 malware families we evaluated, 8 families were recorded to have some level of SMS
abuse. The apps in the Pirater family send SMS to all contacts on the user’s phone,
posing as the user. The socially engineered, “friendly” SMS generated by Pirater
contains a link that downloads the same malware to the receiver’s phone if clicked.
The MobileTX family, on the other hand, does not just abuse SMS functionality,
but also transmits the phone’s ICCID to a private number via SMS. The remaining
6 families send specially crafted SMS to premium numbers. We have not recorded
any phone call interceptions, spoofing, or recording in any of the analyzed malware.
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We observed the use of SMS in 2 apps and CALLs from 3 apps which belong to the
communication category on Google Play. In all these instances, the SMS and CALLs
were authorized by the user, based on user-supplied input.
Reflection and Dynamic Class Loading
The Reflection API is part of the standard Java environment and allows method calls
to be resolved dynamically at runtime. It is a powerful tool that can be employed
by malware to evade static detection. We have observed 5 malware families that
use reflection in different ways. We then examine if such invocation exhibits some
element of malicious intent. The Mobsquz and FakeDoc families reflectively check if
the device has support for telephony-related services (phone calls and SMS). Although
this may not necessarily constitute malicious behavior, given the functionality of the
applications as an antivirus scanner and battery optimizer, it requires further analysis.
The FaceNiff family uses reflection to invoke the methods of a background service that
spoofs user accounts and passwords after it has successfully executed the super user
command. The 2 other remaining families, BaseBridge and DroidDream, are not
suspicious as they both invoke methods from GUI-related classes. We observed 34
instances of reflective call invocation on the Google Play apps. Surprisingly, this
is higher than the malware. However, none of the API calls invoked are from our
sensitive API call list. We also observed that the BaseBridge family dynamically
creates 3 jar files (bootablemodule.jar, moduleconfig.jar, mainmodule.jar) and 2
dex files (mainmodule.dex and bootablemodule.dex). Within the timeframe for our
automated testing and even with an extended manual execution afterwards, the app
did not load these new classes dynamically as expected. Thus, we rewrote the binary
to force the app to load the new dex files. This enables our dynamic instrumentation
to trace the loading joinpoint and the newer classes were instrumented using our
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dynamic instrumentation engine. For the Google Play apps, 7 dynamic classes were
loaded in 5 apps within our testing time. We were able to successfully instrument
and execute all the dynamic classes.
Native Processes
Android applications are commonly written in pure Java code, although quite a
number of them include an embedded C/C++ binary. Over the years, Android
malware has exploited this capability to embed mostly root exploits that trigger
privilege escalation. In other instances, Linux commands that communicate with the
underlying Android kernel are becoming increasingly common. In our data set, 9
out of the 100 malware families invoke native processes 72 times. Commands like
su, chmod, ps, mount and Android’s logcat are the most widely executed native
processes. We have also noted the execution of an unknown binary (myicon) in
DroidKungFu family. Since AspectDroid does not instrument native code, we log the
code path and then manually extract the code using adb. An Md5Sum later verified
that the native binary is a root exploit belonging to the family RageAgainstTheCage.
We’ve noticed native code execution in 6 out of the 100 Google Play apps. In
comparison with the malware apps, the Google Play apps all executed “.so” libraries
vs. starting other processes like chmod or su. Beyond exploring that a particular
native code has been called within the Java execution, AspectDroid does not monitor
its content as the instrumentation engine works only on Java. Thus it is inconclusive
what some unknown native libraries do.
5.5.3 Runtime Overhead
The most important costs of instrumentation occur at runtime, since both CPU and
memory usage are vital on a resource constrained machine. It is especially important
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that apps limit their resource usage to avoid possible garbage collection. Though
uncommon in foreground processes, this does occur when apps consume too many
resources.
The CPU usage is the percentage of CPU time used by a process. We measured
the value given the system uptime (uTime), processes start time (startTime) and the
CPU time spent in both user and kernel code for the main process and any of its
child processes (uTime, sTime, cuTime, csTime). The formula is given below:
seconds = upT ime− (startT ime/Hertz)
tTime = uT ime + sT ime + CuTime + csT ime
cpuusage = ((tT ime/Hertz)/seconds) ∗ 100
(5.5.1)
We carried out this experiment by re-running the 100 malware families using
automated testing on the same platform, keystroke seeds, and number/pattern of
system and user events. Using the procrank utility, we obtained the process memory
size from each app both before and after instrumentation as well as the CPU indices
above. The experiment was executed 5 times and an average for each metric (Memory
and CPU) was computed.
The dark portion of the stacked bar chart illustrated in Figure 5.3 shows the
memory usage for each malware pre-instrumentation, while the lighter shade shows
the overhead after instrumentation. The data illustrates that the MemSize difference
is uniform and on average, 1MB of additional memory is required to execute the
instrumented application. This translates to approximately 16% more memory usage
on average. In our tests, this overhead caused no issues with any of the apps.
Figure 5.4 on the other hand shows the percentage of CPU needed to render
and execute each malware. The dark portion indicates the CPU usage before
instrumentation while the lighter portion stacked showed the CPU usage overhead.
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Figure 5.3: MemSize Overhead (MB)
Figure 5.4: CPU usage Overhead (%)
Although the results are not uniform, the average CPU overhead is approximately
5.91%. Some apps tend to have significantly more overhead than others. We manually
examined these apps and found two important factors: the number of data sources
tagged and the propagation path can have a varied and compounded impact on the
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CPU usage overhead. CPU intensive apps like games that requested a lot of tagged
data, and especially if the request is along the path of an Activity, tend to require
more CPU time to load the activity, thus increasing the percentage of CPU usage
(e.g., the PJApps and Jifake families). Although the Fujacks malware family has
the highest CPU usage pre-instrumentation, its overhead is negligible since it did not
request any tagged data.
5.6 Challenges and Discussion
In the evaluation section we discussed the accuracy of the AspectDroid algorithm
in detecting data leaks, the importance of tracing resource abuse and detection of
suspicious behaviors like reflection, native code and dynamic class loading. Further-
more, we also highlighted the overhead associated with our system. Naturally, some
challenges remain. In bytecode weaving, the compiler has to make a best effort
adjustment to registers, fields, methods and instructions of the weaved class. Some
applications can be sensitive to this kind of intrusion and as such can pose a setback
in our re-compilation process. We make a best effort to optimize the weaving process,
especially in data flow aspects, while at the same time keeping false negatives as low
as possible. Specifically, we ensure that:
1. Propagation rule 1, which handles primitive returns, excludes void and boolean
values. Allowing boolean values in our taint map significantly increases false
positives.
2. GUI-related classes that handle graphics, views, and activities are also excluded
from propagation in propagation rule 7.
3. Well-known public libraries from Android, Amazon, Google, Samsung, and
Apache are excluded from the scope of weaving, however their calls are included
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within the signatures, if necessary.
4. We use abstract methods within advices to reduce the number of instructions
added directly to the weaved class.
Overall, our system effectively uses these optimization techniques to boost its accuracy
and performance. In our testing, AspectDroid has proven to be effective in analyzing
data flow paths, sensitive API monitoring, and analysis of suspicious behaviors. It
provides a flexible and efficient system for assessing Android applications and does
so with relatively low overhead.
5.6.1 Limitations
The main limitations of every static bytecode instrumentation are anti-unpacking
and anti-repackaging obfuscation mechanisms. Developers can include obfuscated
bytecode in their compiled dex files that decompilers cannot parse correctly. However,
in most cases this obfuscation does not affect method invocation, which is what As-
pectDroid uses to create joinpoints. Furthermore, malware can detect instrumentation
code and/or change the package signatures, which can negatively affect analysis with
AspectDroid .
As opposed to variable level tainting, AspectDroid’s data flow compares the
hashes of raw data and as such cannot be affected by simple manipulations through
variable re-assignment. However, arithmetic instructions can have an adverse effect
on our taint propagation (though we have not encountered such in our analysis). As
mentioned in Section 3, joinpoints on conditional instructions cannot be created due
to the limitation in the Aspectj’s APIs. This limits our data flow analysis to explicit
data exfiltration.
Another limitation of our approach is analysis of native code. At this point,
AspectDroid can only trace to the point where a native class is loaded and executed
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and it can return the name and parameters for the execution. However, it cannot
trace inside native code. Very few Android applications use native code and even
with malware, the native code is typically used only for privilege escalation which is
heavily dependent on system vulnerabilities. Addressing this issue is the subject of
future work.
69
Chapter 6
Android Data Storage
6.0.1 SQLite Database
SQLite is a single-user relational database management system (RDMS) used for
storing structured data. Unlike a traditional RDMS, SQLite is a server-less database
engine that stores data in normal files. It manages access and concurrency based on
direct file reads and writes and operating system-level file locks, respectively. SQLite
is lightweight and efficient and requires little configuration, making it the database
engine of choice on many operating systems, such as Android and Apple’s iOS.
On Android, SQLite is used to store both private data at the application level
and system-wide data like contacts and calendars. SQLite does not provide a facility
for enforcing access restrictions on stored data and Android layers security on top of
SQLite by prohibiting applications from directly accessing native databases. Instead,
applications must use the Content Provider library, which enforces mandatory access
control through the permissions model. Read and write access to these content
providers must be explicitly granted at application installation time and permissions
are checked at runtime when the providers are accessed.
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6.0.2 Android Native Providers
Android offers built-in native content providers that store a variety of user data
maintained by the system. Each is associated with at least one SQLite database that
contains various tables, columns and entities. Some of the Android native providers
are: Contacts, CallLog, VoiceMail, Browser, Settings, Media, and Dictionary.
These providers together with the content resolver provide the basis for Android
CRUD (Create, Read, Update, Delete) operations, corresponding to SQL insert,
query, update, and delete operations on database objects. The chain of events for data
access occurs at two levels. At a high level, access begins with the resolver object’s
invocation of one of the CRUD functions, passing at least a Uri parameter, which
identifies the location of the required data. Other parameters for CRUD functions
include column name(s), a WHERE clause, and order information. The resolver
validates the Uri and then passes the request to its provider. The provider performs
permission checks and if the requesting application has the required permissions, it
uses the function parameters to construct an appropriate SQLiteStatement.
At a lower level, the SQLiteStatement is passed to the native content provider
through the binder parcel. The native library translates the parcel and sends the
request to the database engine, which then performs syntax and semantic checks,
expansion and code generation. The result is sent back through the same route. In
the case of read operations, a database Cursor is returned, For write operations, an
integer indicating the number of entries affected is returned. The diagram in Figure
6.1 illustrates CRUD operations on Android’s native databases.
As discussed above, each of the CRUD operations triggers permission checks
by the content provider. Queries are protected by READ permission while insert,
delete, and update are guarded by WRITE permission. However, these coarse-
grained permissions do not distinguish database roles for applications or privileges
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Figure 6.1: CRUD Operation on Android Content Providers
for individual data items. A simple READ permission allows access to all the tables,
columns and rows in the entire database, while a simple WRITE permission allows
manipulation or deletion of any database entities.
6.0.3 Threats and Vulnerabilities
The coarse-grained access control for databases under Android has serious security
and privacy implications. In our preliminary research, we analyzed the contacts
database and explored some issues associated with providing arbitrary applications
with READ and WRITE access to this database.
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Security Implications
Denial of Service: We explored a vulnerability with account types based on a
malformed SQL statement that can crash the acore process, resulting in denial of
service on the phone. A malicious app with WRITE permission can create a new
contact without the user’s knowledge under the “com.google” account type with a
malformed account-name which contains a SQL terminator ”;”. The system will
accept the malformed account name at the time of insertion, but after a while,
Android will try to synchronize and delete bad account names. When this occurs,
the malformed account-name will trigger a SQL exception in the SELECT statement
and crash both the contacts application and the acore process. This key process is
designed to automatically restart after it is killed, however, the malformed name will
cause it to die once again. The repeated restart followed by crash of acore results in
a denial of service attack on the phone and the only solution is to delete the entire
contacts database, causing a loss of all local contacts if the user has no backups at
hand.
Permission Leak: We also discovered that applications with the READ-
CONTACTS permission can infer the user accounts on a device without requesting the
GET-ACCOUNT permission. If a contact belongs to an account, the account name
will be written alongside the contact in the RAW-CONTACTS table. And since there
is no restriction on schema or column, an application can read the account name and
type for all the contacts on the phone.
Malicious Contact: Finally, an application with WRITE access to the contacts can
add a new contact under a particular account and group without restriction. When
that account is synced, the contact gets pushed on to the server. This becomes a
serious problem if, for example, the contact is pushed into an important work group
that shares confidential information or if a contact’s email address is secretly updated,
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to facilitate a targeted attack.
Privacy and Attribution
Applications with appropriate coarse-grained permissions can read clearly mapped
data containing names, phone numbers, email and physical addresses, and even IM
status. This data can clearly distinguish an individual and be used for annoying
advertisement or targeted social engineering attacks. Worse, information such as “last
time contacted” can provide inferential information about call logs without having
the CALL-LOG permission.
Furthermore, with WRITE permission, update, insert, and delete database
operations can be performed by an application with very little data available to
support attribution, since Android produces no audit logs associated with database
operations. This is primarily because SQLite is a single user system and is not
designed to keep track of who performs which operations on a system. For forensics
investigation, this makes it very hard to ascertain if a particular entry in the database
is added or updated by the user or by a malicious application.
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Chapter 7
Privacy Policy Enforcement
Techniques
7.1 Fine-grain Access Control
As discussed in the last chapter, Android applications access native SQLite databases
through their Universal Resource Identifiers (URIs), exposed by the Content provider
library. By design, the SQLite engine used in the Android system does not enforce
access restrictions on database content nor does it log database accesses. Instead,
Android enforces read and write permissions on the native providers through which
databases are accessed via the mandatory applications permissions system. This
system is very coarse grained, however, and can allow applications far greater access
to sensitive data than a user might intend. For instance, in the case of the contacts
database, write permission through the associated content provider allows writing
new contacts and manipulating and deleting contacts at will. Of equal concern is
the fact that read permissions allow access to the entire database, including phone
numbers, email addresses, physical addresses, account information, etc. Ultimately,
this large corpus of data that is clearly associated with a particular individual can be
both accessed in malicious fashion and even transferred to a third party server with
almost no restrictions.
75
Looking at the bigger picture, the privacy violation scales beyond the device user
alone. It also exposes data associated with third parties to the prying eyes of malware
and other privacy-violating applications. Clearly mapped information like phone
numbers, email and physical addresses provide sufficient information about third
parties that they could be used to support targeted advertisement, social engineering,
surveillance, data brokerage, and physical attacks.
Furthermore, due to the interconnectivity of the different providers and their
data, we have found the current approach to result in various forms of inferential
permission leaks. Other security breaches like denial of service due to malformed
SQL data as mentioned in the previous chapter are also possible.
To reduce the propensity of these problems and provide users with additional
control over the Android content providers, Mutti et al [59] proposed an integration
of SQLite and SELinux. Based on context security, this system enforces fine grain
access control at the lowest level in the database. Unfortunately, the solution requires
extensive changes in the operating system code to accommodate the security context
schema table and its corresponding library code. Given how long it takes for Android
to effect changes and for manufacturers to integrate such solutions on existing systems,
techniques that require extensive OS modifications are not viable, practical options
for an average user.
To solve these problems, we developed a new privacy enforcement technique that
enforces access restrictions, query-rewriting and database access logging via static
bytecode weaving. Our system, called priVy, does not require any change to the
Android kernel and middleware. Furthermore, priVy does not treat SQLite databases
as a single information store with a single set of access permissions; instead, it enforces
restrictions for different schema and entity levels by re-implementing content provider
library code using instrumentation at the application level, based on user-provided
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access restrictions. The new weaved checking code forces the application to access
only user-approved schema or entities, while maintaining application integrity.
7.2 Related Work
7.2.1 Android SQLite
The sensitivity of data and the disastrous effect of its breach has led to more rigorous
research on database security in the recent past. Access control, auditing, authenti-
cation and encryption are all paramount at the server, network, and application level.
Object and system privileges ensures users have the right access level to perform both
administrative and simple data access on the system respectively.
Traditional relational database management systems (RDBMSs) has evolve over
the years, incorporating different levels of security granularity at schemas, column,
and entity level. SE-PostgreSQL [56], for instance, integrates PostgreSQL with
SELinux such that every database object has a security context indicating its privilege
and attributes. Oracle’s virtual private database [46] and INGRES [72] on the other
hand support fine grained access through runtime query modification.
SQLite is an RDBMS which by design is a server-less jumbo file attached to an
application. Its security layer is completely provided by the Android OS through the
READ/WRITE permission system on the file. Although the file is protected from
unauthorized access, privileges on the individual objects (schema, column, entities)
are not segregated. SE-SQLite [59] like SEPostgreSQL is developed by integrating
SELinux into Android SQLite. It provides low-level access control on database schema
and tuples. Our work, though very much related in objective, differs completely in
implementation. Theirs integrated the access policies in the database engine, while
we enforced the access constraints at the application level by hooking the CRUD
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method calls and forcing query-rewriting where necessary. Our system does not
require flashing a customized ROM, thus it is a more accessible and easily deployable
solution.
7.2.2 Instrumentation
Instrumentation has been a vital tool for enforcing secure policies on Android systems
both in static and dynamic contexts. Largely due to ease of application repackaging,
static bytecode weaving at the application level has garnered a lot of attention. Dr.
Android [50] retrofits Android permissions using bytecode instrumentation. Capper
[85] tracks sensitive information flow from source to sink while RetroSkeleton [29]
enforces various flexible security policies at runtime. Appguard [18] and [19] both
provide customizable user-policies through on-the-device application repackaging.
Most of these solutions have the same aim of reducing permissions associated with
an Android app in general, whereas priVy is very specific to access control on SQLite
databases, which permission control alone cannot achieve.
Dynamically, FireDroid [64] and NJAS [21] use ptrace to attach their policy
monitor to the target process. In both of these solutions, security policies are defined
at a lower level by re-mapping the system calls to higher level API calls. The Android
PIN project also supports dynamic binary instrumentation. TISSA [95], Aurasium
[81] Apex [60] all developed different security policies, mostly with respect to reducing
permissions, by extending the Android framework. COMPAC [77] segregates permis-
sions within the components of an application. AdDroid [61] segregates advertisement
and the Android framework by introducing new advertisement APIs and permissions
while AdSplit [69] executes the advertisement code in a different process.
ASM [47], SEAndroid [70], MockDroid [20], and AppFence [48] are operating
system-centric solutions that developed integrated security policies at the kernel and
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Figure 7.1: priVy’s System Architecture.
Dalvik code. While the security policies suggested above can be used to either allow
or deny access to the database file, they cannot address the issue of access control on
the database object.
7.3 System Design
Our goal is to define low-level access controls for Android’s native content providers
and enforce these access controls for third party applications. This will ensure that
users have tight control over read/write accesses on sensitive data for instrumented
applications.
priVy is comprised of two components, a Controller app and Controller stub.
The Controller app is an independent application running in a different process that
registers an instrumented application and sets up and manages its access levels. The
stub provides the weaved code that forces the instrumented app to verify access levels
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at startup, enforce access constraints, perform query-rewriting as necessary, and effect
database auditing. The architecture of priVy is illustrated in Figure 7.1.
7.3.1 Controller Stub
Our approach uses the AspectJ instrumentation framework [53] to insert and enforce
fine level access verification, query re-writing and database auditing for Android’s
native providers.
Depending on the cross cutting concern, signatures can be made very broad
using wildcards or specific with direct package names, return types and parameter
types. In priVy, we designed signatures for Android packages related to data access
on SQLite databases. The three most important are Database, Content Provider
and Resolver. The database package hosts the main SQLite database object and
corresponding methods to query it in raw form. It also provides the Cursor interface
for reading the results of database queries. It is important to note that Android does
not support direct raw access for databases associated with an application with a
different uid. Access to such data can only be provided via the Uri of the target
Content provider. The provider classes expose data of one app to the code executing
in a different process.
Generic AspectJ advices were then developed around the methods in the relevant
classes from the packages discussed above. These advices are encapsulated in an
aspect which is then statically recompiled into an Android binary. The result is the
same Android binary extended with our controller stub. This static instrumentation
process intercepts the resolver CRUD functions and inserts the controller code where
necessary. As mentioned in Section 2, direct access to native databases is completely
prohibited by Android and access is only available through the exposed native content.
Thus, it is relatively convenient for us to develop specific signatures corresponding to
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Table 7.1: Joinpoints Picked by priVy ’s Pointcut Signatures
Target Object Insert Update Query Delete
Content Resolver insert(..) update(..) query(..) delete(..)
Content Resolver bulkInsert(..)
ContentProviderOperation newInsert(..) newUpdate(..) newAssertQuery(..) newDelete(..)
only the resolver and provider packages.
As shown in Table 7.1, insertion operations can be performed in three different
ways, either via a single insert, bulk insert, or using a content provider operation.
Delete, update, and query operations can each be performed in two different ways.
Our signatures take into account all these and we target the respective joinpoints
accordingly.
With the exception of adding auditing log entries, where code is inserted using
“after” advice, all other code that performs constraint checks and query-rewriting uses
“around” advice, which can perform code injection in the middle of method execution
and allows manipulation of target object, parameter(s) and return value. This enables
us to generate the correct return values in case a query is blocked or restricted. It
also allows us to enforce constraints and reflectively perform new method invocation
on an already created object residing in memory.
Access Verification
At runtime, when the instrumented app begins execution, the controller stub performs
the access verification as illustrated in Figure 7.1. It reads and parses the assigned
access control for the target application from the world readable, shared preferences
XML file for the controller app. It sets up the global variables for the access level,
schema, and column as well as entity privileges for each provider. The global variables
are used by the CRUD operation’s joinpoint to determine how the method call will
proceed when invoked.
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The CRUD function’s access level can be ALL ALLOW, ALL BLOCK and
RESTRICT. The ALL ALLOW access level, as the name implies, does not impose
sanctions on the joinpoint and simply allows it to proceed with its original parameters.
ALL BLOCK, on the other hand, completely blocks the execution of a joinpoint. For
ALL BLOCK, our controller stub must ensure that the query is actually blocked
while not affecting application stability. We are able to achieve this by ensuring
the affected functions return appropriate values as shown in Figure 7.2 for Query
joinpoint. Specifically, depending on the type of access functions, different actions
must be taken:
1. Query and Insert: We transform the given Uri parameter of the function into
an Entity Uri with appended zero. For queries, the system proceeds with this
special entity Uri which in turn will force the return of an empty cursor with
at least header information. For insert operations, the entity Uri gets returned
and the parameters are discarded.
2. Update and Delete: Functions performing update and delete operations expect
an integral return type indicating how many rows were affected. We simply
return 0, indicating that no rows were affected and thus the program will
continue to execute smoothly.
The RESTRICT option regulates access to database schema, columns, and
entities. In a relational database, a schema represents a logical group of objects. In
this paper we restrict the schema definition to the database tables available through
the content Uri, e.g., the contact table in “Contacts.db” or the events table in
“Calendar.db”. Also, we logically include all objects in a table that can be grouped
by the same MIME types, like emails, phone numbers, and addresses, as different
schemas.
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pointcut getCurObj(Uri uri, String[] Projection,  
String Selection, String[] Selection_Args): 
 call(*..*Cursor* *..*.query(..))   
|| call(*..*Cursor* *..*.*Query(..))) 
 && args(uri, Projection, Selection,  
Selection_Args,..) && NotNewLogger(); 
  
Object around(Object tar, Uri uri, String[] Projection,  
String Selection, String[] Selection_Args): 
 target(tar) && getCurObj(uri, Projection,  
Selection, Selection_Args){ 
//... 
//... 
 ContentValues cont = getAccess();//From SharedPrefs 
 if (cont.containsKey(uri.getAuthority())){ 
  start = System.nanoTime(); 
String level = 
cont.get(uri.getAuthority()).toString(); 
  if (level.equals("ALL_ALLOW")){ 
   ret = proceed(tar, uri, Projection,  
Selection, Selection_Args); 
  }else if (level.equals("ALL_BLOCK")){ 
ret =  proceed(tar, getEntityUri(uri), 
Projection, Selection, Selection_Args); 
  }else if (level.equals("RESTRICT")) { 
   checkSRestrict(..);//Schema Restriction 
   //... 
   checkCRestrict(..);//Column Restriction 
   //... 
   checkERestrict(..);//Entity Restriction 
  
}else{ 
    
  } 
 }!
Figure 7.2: Advice on a Query Joinpoint that Shows How the Controller Stub
Performs Access Verification
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Thus, the schema restriction ensures an app only queries from the approved
tables or MIME type(s). Since most of these MIME types have individual Uris
assigned to them through the CommonKind Uri, their schema restriction must
ensure a entity restriction on the main table as well. The controller stub makes a
decision to ALLOW, BLOCK or REWRITE the query based on the schema restriction
established by the user. For example, if a user has a schema restriction set up to only
allow access to email information and and the app requests both email and phone
numbers, priVy must re-write the query such that only the email table gets projected
on the SQL statement. Furthermore, restrictions can be imposed on database columns
so that certain columns are prohibited from being viewed by apps, e.g., account-type
and name, or an entity based on a column value.
Aside from the two mandates mentioned above for BLOCK option, a third
condition becomes necessary here, specifically, that priVy must ensure that any other
part of the application that depends on the return value of the function does not
crash. This is mostly an issue with query functions, because they return a cursor and
the program may have been designed to access a particular column which may not be
available due to restrictions. To solve this problem, we instrument all the functions
that access cursor information directly. The advice on these joinpoints tests if the
column requested is available and if it isn’t, the column will return a empty string.
This has proven to work well in practice to ensure that applications do not crash due
to the imposed access restrictions.
Query Re-Writing
Android creates a proper SQLstatement after the request has passed the permission
checks. Since our system operates at the highest level, we rewrite the intended query
by altering and/or supplying new CRUD function argument(s). These functions con-
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// qSRestrict contains list of restricted Uri 
public Uri checkSRestrict(ArrayList<String> qSRestrict,  
Uri uri, ContentResolver resolver){ 
 if (qSRestrict.contains(resolver.getType(uri))){ 
  uri= getEntityUri(uri); 
 }else{ 
  //...   
 } 
  //...  
}!
Figure 7.3: Schema Restriction Check on a Query Function
tains Uri, Projection, Selection, Selection-Arguments and Content Values parameters.
In SCHEMA restriction, priVy compares the query Uri with the restricted
schema; if matched, the query is simply blocked otherwise the system allows it to
execute. The code snippet is shown in Figure 7.3.
The query-rewriting module is triggered when the initial query is projected
on column(s) and/or entities outside its access restrictions. In a query function a
projection argument can take an array of column names or null (indicating all rows
in a table should be returned). Armed with the column-level access restriction, the
Controller stub executes the checkCRestrict function and re-writes the query based
on the following rules;
1. If projection is not null - the stub checks for the intersection of the
projected column(s) and the restricted column(s) and then removes them from
the projection list as shown in Figure 7.4.
2. If the prohibited column is the only column to be projected - the
function will be blocked completely. This is because exchanging the prohibited
list with null will return all the columns including the prohibited ones.
3. If projection is null - For query, the stub checks the intersection of the
columns of the return cursor and the restricted column(s). If found, the
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 if (Projection!=null){ 
  if(myMap.keySet().contains(resolver.getType(uri))){ 
   String val = myMap.get(resolver.getType(uri)); 
   for(String str: Projection){ 
    if(!(resolver.getType(uri)+str).equals 
(resolver.getType(uri)+val)){ 
     newProj.add(str); 
    } 
}finProj = newProj.toArray(new 
String[newProj.size()]); 
  }else{ 
   finProj= Projection; 
  } 
} 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4: Column-level Restriction with Not-Null Projection
intersected column(s) are removed and the query continues with the remaining
column as shown in Figure 7.5. For Update and Insert, restricted column are
prevented from database write thus key sets of the content values are compared
against the restricted column and removed if there is an intersection. Delete
operations do not require column projection.
Selection and Selection-Arguments indicate the WHERE clause column(s) and
value(s). The user can restrict access on some predefined values, e.g., to certain
account types, whitelisted contacts, etc. For the most part, we don’t test or nullify
these arguments, but rather we enforce the new specification by concatenating our
restriction to an already established WHERE clause. For instance, an application
might be restricted to only query contacts from account-type “com.google” and
we simply ensure that this is enforced by influencing the WHERE clause. If this
restriction involves only one entity, the controller stub appends it with an “AND”
operator to the function’s WHERE clause, if not null. If the WHERE clause is null,
however, the stub then substitutes the null with the new restriction, and the function
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 if (ret instanceof Cursor){ 
  Cursor cur =(Cursor)ret; 
  if(cur.getCount()>0){ 
   String[] pNames = cur.getColumnNames(); 
   if(myMap.keySet().contains 
(resolver.getType(uri))){ 
String val = 
  myMap.get(resolver.getType(uri)); 
    for(String str: pNames){ 
     if(!(resolver.getType(uri) 
+str).equals(resolver.getType 
(uri)+val)){ 
      newProj.add(str); 
} 
    }finProj = newProj.toArray(new  
     String[newProj.size()]);   
      
}else{ 
    finProj= null; 
   } 
  } 
 } 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.5: Column-level Restriction with Null Projection
proceeds with this new value. On the other hand, the situation is more challenging
when there are more than one entity restriction and it applies to different tables (e.g.,
account type (Raw Contacts) and lookup key (Contacts)). In typical SQL we can
perform complex joins on the different tables. However, on content providers such
operations are very limited. To solve this, we extract the primary key (and foreign
key where necessary) from each of the tables and use them as the parameter(s) for
the target query’s WHERE clause as shown in 7.6.
For example, consider the query “ ID from contacts WHERE lookup key =
value” and the query “ ID and RAW CONTACT ID from raw contacts WHERE
account type = value”. The intersection of ID and RAW CONTACT ID in these
query results will be the new WHERE clause for the target CRUD operation.
For delete and update functions, a developer may or may not supply the
WHERE clause and/or its argument. According to a user’s preferences, our system
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public String checkERestrict(Uri uri, ContentResolver resolver){ 
 String finSel= null; 
 if (uri.getAuthority().contains("contacts")){ 
 // for each entity restriction,   
 // getContactIds(..) gets its primary key column.    
 //The intersection of the results is return in fin 
  String fin = getContactIds(resolver); 
  if(fin!=null){ 
   if(uri.equals(ContactsContract.Contacts. 
CONTENT_URI)){ 
   finSel = ContactsContract.Contacts._ID +  
" IN ( "+fin+" )"; 
}else if (uri.equals(ContactsContract.Data. 
CONTENT_URI)){ 
    finSel = ContactsContract.Data. 
RAW_CONTACT_ID + " IN ( "+fin+" )"; 
   }else{ 
    finSel = ContactsContract. 
RawContactsEntity.CONTACT_ID + " IN ( 
"+fin+" )"; 
   } 
  } 
 } 
 return finSel; 
}!
Figure 7.6: Code Snippet Showing Entity Restriction for Contacts Provider
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can enforce restrictions on when and where delete operations can occur by reflectively
invoking a new delete function within the joinpoint on the target object. After it
returns, the new return value is supplied as the return value of the joinpoint’s advice
as shown in Figure 7.7.
Database Auditing
SQLite database is a single user RDBMS. But nevertheless, on Android, important
native databases are often accessed by multiple applications which are considered
individual users with different user IDs. It is important to keep track of which appli-
cations perform which actions on system resources, especially since these applications
are typically created by different developers and may manipulate the same data with
few restrictions. Currently, Android does not support this kind of fine-grain auditing.
In our prototype implementation of priVy, we introduce auditing using a file
attached to the Controller app called the auditLog. We implement this by injecting
the auditing function after the CRUD function has executed and returned a desired
result. For insert, an “after” advice will request for the returned Uri and then parse
it get the row id. This package name, row id, together with Uri name, Content Values
and time stamp are written to the auditLog file.
On update, the return value is the number of rows affected rather than the Uri.
Thus, we need a global variable to keep track of the row lookup ids (rowid) affected
by the update function. We use this global rowid, together with package name, Uri
name, selection and its arguments (if any), content values and time stamp as an audit
file entry. This also applies for Delete operations. Query operations return a Cursor,
thus we keep the audit of the query parameters as well as the number of rows in the
cursor. We do not track the IDs of the columns because it may or may not be part of
the projection list. The code snippet for auditing query operations is shown in Figure
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pointcut deleteInst(Uri uri):call(* *..*.delete(..))  
 && NotNewLogger() && args(uri,..); 
    
Object around(Uri uri, ContentResolver tar):  
 deleteInst(uri) && target(tar){ 
 if (access.containsKey(uri.getAuthority())){ 
  // 
   // 
  }else if (level.equals("RESTRICT")){ 
   ContentResolver resolver = null; 
   if (tar instanceof ContentResolver){ 
    resolver = (ContentResolver)tar;  
   } 
   if (resolver!=null){ 
    //check Schema Restriction 
    uri = checkSRestrict(qSRestrict,  
     uri, resolver); 
   } 
   if (!uri.toString().contains("/0")){ 
    Log.d(uri.toString(), "here3"); 
    //check Entity Restriction 
    String finSel = checkERestrict(uri, 
      resolver); 
    if(finSel!=null){ 
     //populate selection 
    } 
   String[] selArgs = (String[])args[2]; 
   Object[] params = new Object[]{uri,  
    sel, selArgs}; 
   Class clazz = thisJoinPoint.getSignature(). 
    getDeclaringType(); 
   //Reflectively Recreate Delete  
   //function with new selection and  
   //return number of rows deleted  
   try { 
    String methName = thisJoinPoint. 
    getSignature().getName(); 
    Class[] paraTypes  
     =getMeth(thisJoinPoint); 
    Method method  
     =clazz.getDeclaredMethod(methName,  
     paraTypes);  
    ret = method.invoke(tar, params); 
    delRet= true; 
   }catch (Exception e){ 
    delRet=false;  
    e.printStackTrace(); 
   }  
  // 
 } 
 return ret; 
}!
//
//
//
Figure 7.7: Code Snippet Showing Query Re-writing for Delete Function
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7.8.
Apart from its major objectives, our controller stub further checks for malformed
strings in arguments passed to the CRUD function. This is important so as to prevent
the denial of service attack mentioned in Section 6.0.3. This functionality checks for
special characters in the content value(s) of an insert or update function. It then
triggers a warning to the user and he/she can opt to remove any special character.
7.3.2 Controller App
The controller app running on a separate process coordinates the content provider
restrictions for targeted applications. Our aspects are written as generically as
possible to integrate into any Android app as well as work for all the native
providers. The controller app provides an interface for choosing the access levels
and further access restrictions on schema, column or entity, thus saving the cost of
re-instrumentation in case changes need to be made. This significantly improves the
usability of our approach.
When an application is installed, the user needs to register it with the controller.
Its user interface (UI) exposes the available access level/restrictions for the user to
choose from. After selection, the values is stored for the target application in a shared
preferences XML file maintained by this controller app. The Controller stub queries
these files at runtime. The controller app maintains three different XML files for the
access level, constraints, and the arguments, as shown in Figure 7.1.
1. Access.xml - this file contains entries for all registered instrumented apps. It
takes the concatenation of package name, provider names, and CRUD function
name as the key which is also the record identifier RID, while the value contains
the access level as ALL ALLOW, ALL BLOCK, or RESTRICT. Listing 7.1
shows an example of a key:value pair in Access.xml file.
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after(Uri uri, String[] Projection, String Selection,  
String[] Selection_Args) returning (Cursor ret):  
 getCurObj(uri, Projection, Selection, Selection_Args){ 
 //... 
 if (ret.getCount()>0 ){ 
  String vals=null; 
  StringBuilder stb = new StringBuilder(); 
  if(Projection!=null){ 
   for(String str: Projection){ 
    stb.append(str); 
    stb.append(","); 
   } 
   
  } 
  vals = stb.toString(); 
  String args=null; 
  stb = new StringBuilder(); 
  if(Selection_Args!=null){ 
   for(String str: Selection_Args){ 
    stb.append(str); 
    stb.append(","); 
   } 
  } 
  args = stb.toString(); 
 String audit = "Time"+Long.toString(System.nanoTime()) 
+" Uri "+uri.toString() +" Values "+vals + "Selection" 
+Selection + " Selection_Args "+ args+ 
  thisJoinPoint.getSignature().getDeclaringTypeName()+ 
"."+thisJoinPoint.getSignature().getName(); 
  Log.d("R-DAC","Query Audit- "+audit); 
  //… 
}!
Figure 7.8: Instrumentation Code Snippet for Auditing Query Operations
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2. Constraint.xml - If the access level is set to RESTRICT, the schema, column,
or entity constraint has to be provided. This constraint is registered in
constraint.xml. Its entries are the RID as provided in Access.xml file and
the values are the constraints separated by commas as shown in Listing 7.2.
Empty brackets indicate there is no constraint on the element. The SCHEMA
constraint has to take complete Uri string names, while the COLUMN and
ENTITY constraints contain the Uri and column name, each of which can have
zero or more constraints.
3. Argument.xml - As mentioned above, the ENTITY constraints are enforced
in the WHERE clause of the SQLStatement. Thus for each entry in the
Constraint.xml file that contains a record for an ENTITY constraint, there must
exist an record in the Argument.xml file that provides the argument value(s).
For example, if Constraint.xml contains a record as shown in Listing 7.2, the
Argument.xml file will have a corresponding record as shown in Listing 7.3. This
constraint ensures an app is restricted from querying contacts using clauses like
“WHERE account type is “com.google””.
Listing 7.1: Entry in Access.xml
key - com.bbm:contacts:query:
value <RESTRICT>
Listing 7.2: Entry in Constraint.xml
key - com.bbm:contacts:query:
value < SCHEMA(),
COLUMN(vnd.android.cursor.dir/contact:
display_name),
ENTITY(vnd.android.cursor.dir/raw_contacts:
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Figure 7.9: Relationship Between Instrumentation Time and Extra Joinpoints
account_type)
>
Listing 7.3: Entry in Arugument.xml
key - com.bbm:contacts.query:
value < ENTITY((vnd.android.cursor.dir/raw_contacts:
account_type) :com.google)>
Apart from creating and managing access verification information, the controller
app also manages the auditLog file.
7.4 Implementation
We implemented the prototype of our approach in Python, Java and AspectJ as
the weaving framework. The Controller app is written as a standalone Android
application with three shared preference files that store the access level, constraints,
and its arguments for an instrumented app. This app does not require any permissions
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to install. For the Controller stub, the instrumentation process is implemented using
Python scripts which automate application unpacking, repacking and signing, while
the weaving aspect is written using Java/AspectJ.
Android apps are shipped as a single zip file called an apk, which contains the
main classes.dex file and other resource files. The classes.dex is a highly optimized
compressed file that contains the Dalvik bytecode which is parsed and interpreted
by the Dalvik Virtual machine at runtime. It is created by removing redundant
information from the app’s compiled Java classes. The AspectJ framework, on the
other hand, does not understand the Dex file format. Thus, to weave-in the Controller
stub, we need to unpack from Dex to Java class files.
The automated instrumentation processing makes use of an open source Dalvik
translator called “dex2jar” [23] for the unpacking, repackaging, and app signing. This
processing is set up on a Linux system with Java and “ajc” compilers installed and
the AspectJ library and the Android SDK on its class-path. The weaving module
takes the unpacked classes as input and after recompilation executes the repackaging
and resigning modules, respectively.
We developed generic aspects that can be woven into any Android application to
enforce access control on any of the 7 native providers. However we limited our testing
and evaluation to contacts and calendar providers. These two providers contain
valuable and sensitive data for both the device user and any third party associated
with the user. According to [40], the contact information is by far the biggest privacy
concern of all the sensitive data found on smartphones. The contacts provider exposes
different kinds of data via its numerous Uris. These data are contained in three tables
(Contacts, Raw Contacts, Data) under the contacts database, while the calendar
provider exposes five tables (Calendars, Events, Attendees, Reminders, Instance)
from the calendar database through its URIs.
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Our aspect has a total of 11 pointcuts which corresponds to the 9 method calls
as shown in Table 7.1, one pointcut for application context, and one for the aspect
itself. It also has a total of 16 advices for these pointcuts and numerous Java-related
methods that support the functionality of the advices.
7.5 Evaluation
The target of our evaluation covers two main objectives; overhead and application
crash. priVy is developed as a user-centric solution with the aim of providing a
reliable means of securing and restricting access to native database objects. The goal
is to ensure priVy works on a diverse group of applications with minimal overhead.
Furthermore, we want to ensure the instrumented app does not crash as a result of
the weaved controller stub.
We downloaded the top 350 applications from Google Play [5] and choose 76
apps with read/write permission to either the contacts or calendar providers. Our
samples are instrumented and repackaged with new sign-in keys. We assess their
static overhead in terms of weaving time and number of joinpoints created.
We also measure the runtime overhead, which is the time it takes to execute
each of our joinpoint’s advice. We developed a test application that triggers all the
advices in our aspect (since most of the sample apps trigger only one or two of them)
and measured their execution time. Finally we evaluate app crashes by executing
each of the instrumented applications. Our testbed is a Samsung tablet running
on the Android 4.4.2 kernel. It has some saved contacts under the device’s main
gmail account, local phone numbers, and others imported from one extra Microsoft
Exchange account.
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7.5.1 App Execution
We then executed all the 76 instrumented apps using a three round testing scheme
(total of 228 executions) on the test bed and monitored them for app crashes that
can be directly linked to the instrumentation stub. The testing involves changing the
different access levels - ALL ALLOW, ALL BLOCK and RESTRICT. Each app is
manually installed, executed and profile created for those requiring one. We interact
with them using touch events, text inputs, and various system events like calls. The
testing period for each app ranges between 15 to 20 minutes, depending on the initial
setup required by the app.
In the first round of testing, we set the access policies for all the 76 apps
to ALL ALLOW. Our first observation is five apps (Chase, SendHub, All State,
BlueBird, Citizens) fail to execute or connect to their server in the first round of
testing. An examination into these groups revealed that mostly they are vendor
apps like mobile banking. Such apps, for security reasons, do not execute when the
signature changes or they have broken resources. They fail to execute not because
of our instrumentation stub but because of a change in the application file, thus we
eliminate these from further testing.
The second group of seven apps (Sirma Bible, Docusign, Autodesk, Faith-
ComesbyHearing, Zillow, Backgrounds, Jiffy) did not make any attempt to query the
contacts or calendar database, even though they requested READ and/or WRITE
permission. Thus, they were eliminated too.
The final group executed correctly in all 3 rounds of testing. We randomly
changes the combination of access restrictions that will trigger the query re-writing
module during manual execution and check for app failure. Within the execution
period, we observed that all the 64 apps in this group invoked one or more of our
joinpoints. For instance, the BBM app requested READ CONTACT permission and
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it also asks users explicitly for access to contacts on the setup window. When we
BLOCK all contacts, it was not able to access any. Similarly for RESTRICT, it was
only able to view contacts from the gmail account. This is the same for other apps like
KIK, Pinterest, Mr. Number, AVG AntiVirus, AutoCard, Vine etc. The Sunrise app
uses the calendar provider to manage and organize events. We successfully limited
the events that can be viewed by this app based on Event ID.
We have observed that ≈ 82% of the apps in our sample perform only database
read (query) even though 60% of them request both READ and WRITE permissions.
7.5.2 Static Overhead
Instrumentation entails weaving new code into a binary and optimization becomes
essential in order to avoid bloating the existing code. Specifically, the nature of
pointcut signatures can have adverse effects on the number of joinpoints created and
wildcards that designate all (*) either in the parameter(s), names, or return type
broaden the scope of joinpoint matching. Android has restricted native database
access to very few libraries, and as such we avoided using wildcards where necessary
and used more specific signatures instead.
In this test, we measured the time it takes to perform bytecode weaving as well
as the number of joinpoints that are created. The bytecode weaving involves class
parsing, joinpoint matching and insertion of advices for every class on the jar path
as specified by the weaving aspect. On average it takes 15 seconds weaving time on
our test platform to process each sample app, with the highest and lowest being 65.5
and 3.3 seconds respectively. The plot in figure 7.9 showed no correlation between
instrumentation time and the number of joinpoints created. Nevertheless, we can see
from the cluster that almost all the apps are woven in less than 30 seconds. Manual
investigation into the packages of the outlier applications indicates they contain a
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very large number of classes, thus requiring more time for the compiler to parse and
match the joinpoints. Overall, we find the instrumentation time to be acceptable as
the maximum is slightly above 60 seconds.
In AspectJ weaving, for every matched joinpoint, the compiler adds a call to
its corresponding advice. This is in addition to any Aspect-specific and Java-based
method attached to the aspect class. Based on our sample set, we recorded an average
of 1032 joinpoints created, with the highest being 7407 and the lowest 199. We find
our joinpoint’s overhead of approximately 1000 is on the high side considering there
are about 16 advices. On investigation we find the pointcut that gets application
context is the culprit. Though not part of the main functionality of our aspect, this
pointcut serves as a helper that assigns application context to our query rewriting
joinpoints.
The Aspect class in not part of the traditional Android API and thus cannot
instantiate a context. On the other hand, our advices requires it to get a ContentRe-
solver for nested SQLstatements and the processing of ContentProviderOperations
functions. Thus, we created this pointcut around the onCreate method of every
Activity to get its context. This ensures at every point during the app’s execution,
a context is available to the aspect class. We find this method to be very reliable
since even if one activity dies, the next activity will provide the needed context for
the aspect, but not necessarily efficient.
7.5.3 Runtime Overhead
In this evaluation, we examined the impact of the introduced code on the app
performance on the device at runtime. This is measured as the extra time it takes to
run the advice on a joinpoint. Our advices verify access levels and enforce restrictions
where necessary.
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Table 7.2: priVy ’s Average Runtime Overhead Given Various Access Restrictions
Restrictions Insert (ns) Update (ns) Query (ns) Delete (ns)
1 Schema 59 40 64 47
1 Column 53 45 62 50
1 Entity 23 38 92 54
1 Schema , 1 Column 57 48 58 49
1 Schema , 1 Entity 76 47 70 69
1 Column , 1 Entity 74 50 73 67
1 Schema, 1 Column , 1 Entity 62 70 75 54
Average 57.71 48.29 70.57 55.71
As mentioned in section 3, priVy provides three access levels, and when the
access level is set to RESTRICT, zero or more schema, column and entity restrictions
can be enforced. Thus, considering all this criteria, we expect different possible
combinations for each of the CRUD functions. It is important to note that this
runtime overhead remains the same irrespective of the application executing because
the advice code does not change. However, it is only affected by the access level
and constraints enforced by the user. The more constraints there are, the more
instructions are traversed and the greater the size of the SQLstatement.
To make this experiment possible we develop a testing app that triggers all our
joinpoints and we run it many times with different combinations as shown in Table
7.2.
Each point on the table represents the average time in nanoseconds (ns) required
to execute each CRUD function based on at least one restriction.
ALL BLOCK and ALL ALLOW incurs zero runtime overhead to process
thus these are excluded from the table. The times are computed by Java’s Sys-
tem.nanoTime(). We set the start time at the beginning of the “around” advice
execution and an end time at the beginning of its “after” advice. This ensures we
take the time after the method has returned and before the next instruction. The
difference between the start and the end time is the runtime overhead per joinpoint.
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Our experiments indicates it takes an average of 70 nanoseconds to execute
the joinpoint on update, 55 for delete, 48 for insert, and 57 for query, with imposed
restrictions. Overall our joinpoints take an average of 58 nanoseconds to execute any
of their advice.
Since the static overhead gave us an average of 1032 joinpoints created, our
instrumentation can incur a maximum runtime overhead of 0.06 milliseconds if all
the joinpoints are executed in a single app. We find this overhead to be negligible
and not be noticeable by users.
7.5.4 Access Policies
The access policies exposed by our Controller app enable users to protect the security
and privacy of their devices and its data. For instance, entity restrictions can help
protect devices from adding malicious contact on protected account types such as
google.com or Exchange. The entity restriction is set with an appropriate argument
e.g., “com.google”. Denial of service attacks due to malformed SQL can also be
checked and special characters removed in the content values of an insert or update
function.
Both schema and column restrictions can help reduce the exposure of clearly
mapped data, e.g., enforcing schema restrictions on an email Uri can block a target
app with access to Contacts from mapping contacts phone numbers and their email
addresses. However, to attain absolute protection for some chosen contacts, the user
can set up entity restrictions on individual names, IDs or groups. This will completely
safeguard whole record(s).
Column restrictions can also protect against permission leaks. As mentioned in
Section 3, enumerating account names and types can give apps access to all accounts
on the system just like those provided by the getAccount permission. Thus, a user
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can set a policy to restrict these columns. This policy can be further optimized by
enforcing entity restrictions such that apps can access only their account name and
types.
7.5.5 Limitations
priVy performs instrumentation via application repackaging and thus depends on
the fact that the app will be correctly translated before and after instrumentation.
However this may not be true for apps with:
1. Anti-repackaging techniques that detect and crash the translation process, often
detected at compilation time. To deal with such problems, we use a well
documented and widely used open source utility dex2jar. So far we have not
encountered this issue, but it remains a possibility.
2. Signature verification that detects changes in the developer’s original signature
at runtime. Such an app may not necessarily crash but will fail to either render
its activity or connect to its server. We have encountered some of these apps,
which are mostly banking applications. Support for such applications is outside
the scope of our research.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
8.1 Summary
This research work has focused on developing new techniques for static and hybrid
malware analysis. It ends with a user-level privacy policy enforcement system that
can help protect user data on the device which are otherwise not protected by the
current Android system.
We have presented a novel resilient approach for statically detecting Android
malware variants based on three-level similarity matching. This system generates
signatures for known malicious code as a function of the normalized opcode sequence
found in sensitive functional modules and the permissions app requests. Malware
belonging to the same family often reuses considerable portions of their codebase and
possesses common behavioral characteristics. Permissions requested by an application
gives a hint of what the resulting behavior might likely be. Thus the combination
of these two distinctive features creates a unique and robust signature for known
malware.
The result of our analyses illustrated that we can correctly detect and categorize
malware variants with an F-measure of 98.9% and our system is resilient to some
complex obfuscation schemes, such as reflection, name and string encryption, junk
code insertion, and code reordering. In comparison with current state-of-the-art
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Android malware detection tools, including both commercial antivirus and research
tools, OpSeq ’s outperformed them with an average of 35% detection ratio.
We have also supplement our static analyzer with a hybrid Android app analysis
system that can detect new malware samples. The system, called AspectDroid , pro-
vides an efficient and flexible alternative for detecting suspicious and illicit behavior
independent of Android runtime and or system release. Our goal is to ease analysis
and avoid the numerous problems associated with porting between versions and/or
building customized device kernel. It comprises a primary component called the
instrumentation engine and the secondary components - helper and automated testing
modules.
The instrumentation engine which is at the heart of AspectDroid is designed to
achieve three main objectives: data flow analysis, resource abuse tracing, analytics
of suspicious behavior like native code, and reflective call invocation. AspectDroid
leverages on AspectJ instrumentation framework to inject monitoring code. The
instrumented app is then executed dynamically to trace and log runtime activities at
specific joinpoints. It also has the capability to instrument runtime classes for further
analysis, thus increasing code coverage. We have demonstrated that AspectDroid can
achieve up to 94.68% F-score accuracy in detecting data leaks. Further analysis of
100 malware families for the Drebin dataset and 100 apps from Google Play showed
our system can effectively analyze a diverse set of apps including stealthy malware
with very minimal CPU and memory overhead.
Finally, this research work also presents a privacy policy enforcement technique
via fine-grain access control on the SQLite database. The system called priVy
is a user-centric approach to enforcing object level privilege on Android native
providers. Currently, database objects are not treated differently from their main
source, meaning when access is granted to the SQLite database file, that access
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extends to all the objects encapsulated within it. The native databases contain very
important sensitive data that should not be lumped together as a single entity, hence
our motivation to segregate their access control. Our system priVy is designed to
guarantee user’s privacy is secured in an accessible and highly usable way. It does
not require operating system extensions nor does it tamper with the framework code,
making it a much more practical solution than its contemporaries like SE-SQLite.
priVy leverages static bytecode instrumentation to weave in controlling code
in database CRUD functions. The controller stub ensures that only user-approved
schema, column, and/or entities are accessed by an instrumented application. When
these CRUD operations are intercepted, the attached stub performs access level
verification, query-rewriting where necessary, and proceeds with the function exe-
cution. It also performs database auditing when the attached app accesses any of the
encapsulated objects. Our evaluation results demonstrated priVy incurs a minimal
overhead of 15 seconds instrumentation time and a very negligible execution time
overhead.
8.2 Future Work
One important area to investigate further in our malware/app analyzers - OpSeq
and AspectDroid is the analysis of native code. Both of these systems are designed to
process only the Dalvik instructions. As part of our future work, we aim to extend the
static analyzer to parse and create signatures for the native code. We also intend to
include a debugging mechanism in a future revision of AspectDroid which gets started
via the bytecode rewriting architecture. During native code execution, a debugger
can be started with the ID of the new process to collect lower level syscalls made by
the native code.
Another area of significant interest in AspectDroid is working to improve the
105
automated testing module such that all control flow paths are forced to execute. As
we have seen from the analysis result of AspectDroid , its taint tracking is limited to
explicit data exfiltration, thus, via code refactoring we intend to inject simple methods
after arithmetic and conditional instructions that take the preceding instructions’
parameters. Then jointpoints will be created for the new method call at weaving
time. This will take care of the possible mis-propagation thereby improving our data
flow analysis.
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